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Abstract 
Over the past 20 years the study of language evolution has made significant leaps towards becoming 
a serious scientific endeavour. One recent leap is the investigations of cultural transmission in the 
laboratory, particularly in the realm of iterated learning. However, the research is still very much in 
its infancy, with human iterated learning experiments still only using single individuals in a chain. Yet 
as we know, language is manifestly embedded within the social environment, and as such is subject 
to complex population dynamics. This current thesis expands on human iterated learning by 
expanding the population to two individuals (polyadic) per generation, which in turn introduces 
variability in the input. By comparing this modification with single individual populations (monadic), 
and previous experiments, an empirical framework is developed that can enhance our 
understanding of population dynamics and the emergence of adaptive structure.   
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The influence of linguistics upon Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection is well 
documented (Croft, 2008). Yet in the 150 years since the publication of On the origin of species 
(Darwin, 1859) biological evolution has made significant leaps forward, while research into the 
evolution of language remained comparatively stagnant. In the last two decades, however, 
discerning the evolution of language has become a much sought endeavour. As such, a vast number 
of explanations are emerging that offer a plethora of choice, but little in the way of consensus. In 
particular, language structure is a hot topic of interest, with perhaps the most popular theory of its 
origins stemming from the generative tradition (Chomsky, 1957) and their emphasis on language 
universals and domain-specific language acquisition devices. 
The current state of play is slightly more nuanced, thanks to a growing body of literature offering an 
alternative theoretical spine from a wide variety of disciplines. In particular, there a consensus is 
emerging in which language is not only a conveyer of cultural information, but it is itself a socially 
learned and culturally transmitted system (Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008). This perspective opens up 
a new avenue to investigate the design features of language: that cultural, as opposed to biological, 
evolution is fundamental in understanding these features (Smith & Kirby, 2008).  
In the second chapter, this dissertation will initially consider the design features of human language 
and how we ended up with a communication system of open-ended expressivity. This then leads 
into the various positions across linguistics in discussing language universals, language acquisition 
and natural selection, with the main emphasis being a transition from considering language as solely 
a biological problem to a problem that will only be solved through inclusion of socio-cultural factors. 
Chapter three extends upon the proposition that culture and language should be studied together, 
arguing that in fact language is a culturally transmitted product. In looking at the literature into 
Iterated Learning, this dissertation will review literature regarding the origins of adaptive structure, 
and how population dynamics can inform human iterated learning experiments. Chapter four then, 
outlines how we can adapt current human iterated learning experiments, namely by introducing 
variability in the input. Lastly, Chapter five will report the results from the experiment – discussing 
this in the context of currently available literature.    
 




2.1. Language as unique form of communication 
2.1.1. Design features of language 
Taken as a whole system, language is distinct from any other non-human animal communication 
known. Of this we are almost certain, and yet when we examine other animal communicative 
systems there appears to be certain design features they share with humans. These purported 
similarities and differences were probed by Hockett (1960), who, through his investigations into 
language, offers a useful heuristic for seeing spoken1 language as being composed of 13 design 
features2 (see table 1). 
Design Feature Description 
1) Vocal-auditory channel “The vocal-auditory channel has the advantage – at least for primates – [in] that 
it leaves much of the body free for other activities that can be carried on at the 
same time.” (Hockett, 1960, pg. 6). 
 
2) Broadcast transmission  
and directional reception 
“A linguistic signal can be heard by any auditory system within earshot, and the 
source can normally be localized by binaural direction-finding.” (ibid). 
 
3) Rapid Fading “The rapid fading of such a signal means that it does not linger for reception at 
the hearer’s convenience.” (ibid). 
 
4) Interchangeability “In general, a speaker of a language can reproduce any linguistic message he 
can understand, whereas the characteristic courtship motions of the male and 
female stickleback are different, and neither can act out those appropriate to 
the other.” (ibid).  
 
5) Total feedback “Again, a speaker of a language hears, by total feedback, everything of linguistic 
relevance in what he himself says.” (ibid). 
 
6) Specialization “*…+ refers to the fact that the bodily effort and spreading sound waves of 
speech serve no function except as signals.” (ibid). 
 
7) Semanticity “*…+ there are relatively fixed associations between elements of messages (e.g. 
words) and recurrent features or situations of the world around us” (ibid). 
 
8) Arbitrariness “*...+ the ties between the meaningful message elements and their meanings 
can be arbitrary” (ibid). 
 
9) Discreteness “Human vocal organs can produce a huge variety of sound. But in any one 
language only a relatively small set of ranges of sound is used, and the 
differences between these ranges are functionally absolute.” (ibid). 
                                                             
1 Hockett strictly specified that only spoken languages display all thirteen of the features, as opposed to other human 
language systems such as writing and sign. 
2 Hockett & Altmann (1968) actually add three additional design features (Prevarication, Reflexiveness, and Learnability). 




10) Displacement “Man is apparently almost unique in being able to talk about things that are 
remote in space or time (or both) from where the talking goes on.” (ibid). 
 
11) Productivity “*language provides+ the capacity to say things that have never been said or 





“Human genes carry the capacity to acquire a language, and probably also a 
strong drive towards such acquisition, but the detailed conventions of any one 
language are transmitted extragenetically by learning and teaching.” (ibid). 
 
13) Duality of Patterning “The meaningful elements in any language (e.g. words).constitute an enormous 
stock. Yet they are represented by small arrangements of a relatively very small 
stock of distinguishable sounds which are in themselves wholly meaningless.” 
(ibid). 
Table 1. Hockett’s (1960) design features of language. 
This essentially allows us to compare the abilities of humans and other species to see the 
demarcation lines. For instance, the research by von Frisch (1967) into honeybee (Apini Apis) 
communication demonstrates how they are able to use a specific signal (the particular dance 
employed) to relay a specific spatial location outside of the hive. Perhaps most surprisingly, this 
example demonstrates that honeybees are capable of processing semantic content3 (by matching 
the dance signal with a food source meaning), among other aspects, including transmission, 
displacement and productivity, all of which are crucial in the understanding the uniqueness of 
human communication.  
In fact, throughout the animal kingdom there are many instances of certain design features being 
utilised by a wide array of species (see Kirby & Smith, 2008). Incidentally, this leads us to the most 
insightful aspect of Hockett’s paper: that the uniqueness of human communication can be identified 
through just three particular design features (semanticity, productivity and traditional transmission). 
As already touched upon, all three of these features are fairly ubiquitous throughout the animal 
kingdom. However, human language is truly distinct in that it is a combination of these three 
features. In particular, the semantic capacity of humans is far more powerful and productive than 
anything else seen in the animal world, which according to Hockett is because it is underpinned by 
four additional design features: arbitrariness, duality of patterning, recursion and compositionality4. 
                                                             
3 Albeit within very narrow motivational limits: the semantic content refers to food, and nothing else.  
4 As Smith & Kirby note, recursion and compositionality are only implicated in Hockett’s account under the concept of 
productivity, rather than being explicitly mentioned. Recursion is basically the ability to embed identical phrases inside of 
each other, whilst compositionality is defined as an expression that is determined through its structure and the meanings 
of its constituent elements (see Smith & Kirby, 2008). 
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As Smith & Kirby (2008) note, “The combination of these four subsidiary features results in a system 
that is productive and semantic.” (pg. 3592). Duality of patterning enables us to generate a vast 
number of basic units of communication from just a small set of sounds (phonemes). These basic 
units are then, through recursion, combined in an open-ended fashion, despite there being no 
meaningful connection between the phonemes used and the message sent – it is arbitrary. By 
knowing the meaning of these basic elements, and the method through which they are combined, a 
human is able use this compositional structure to interpret novel utterances (ibid). 
Thus far, the overarching sentiment relies on the view of language being a unique and unusual 
communication system due to a particular combination of features, and the robustness with which 
they are utilised. Even more obvious is that these design features are hallmarks of a system designed 
for open-ended expressivity. However, “the fact that human language makes good design sense in 
various ways does not explain how language came to have these properties.” (ibid, pg. 3593). 
Instead, the question we need to be investigating as linguists is: how did these features of language 
come to be this way? 
2.2. Why is language this way? 
2.2.1. Language Universals, Language Acquisition & Natural Selection 
One answer to this question appeals to the idea of humans having an array of specialised organs 
geared towards the production, reception and comprehension of language. For some features, 
particularly the physical capacity to produce and receive multiple vocalizations, there is ample 
evidence for specialisation: a descended larynx (Lieberman, 2003), thoracic breathing (MacLarnon & 
Hewitt, 1999), and several distinct hearing organs (Hawks, in press). Given that these features are 
firmly in the domain of biology, it makes intuitive sense to apply the theory of natural selection to 
solve the problem: humans are specially adapted to the production and reception of multiple 
vocalizations5. 
In his 1980 book Rules and Representations, Noam Chomsky extends this notion further, arguing that 
humans also contain specialised mental organs, or modules, for acquiring language. Tracing the 
history6 of this argument stems initially from the widespread assumption of generative grammar 
that all languages are essentially the same in structure, but differ in their sound systems and 
vocabularies (Evans & Levinson, 2009). To quote Pinker (1994), “According to Chomsky, a visiting 
                                                             
5 I use the term vocalisation as opposed to language because humans may have evolved these adaptations for other 
functional reasons, such as singing or laughing (Lieberman, 2003). Conversely, Hauser & Fitch (2003) debate the role of the 
vocal tract being a language-specific adaptation, citing comparative data with other species that suggests a “*...+ descended 
larynx is not necessarily indicative of speech.” (pg. 165). 
6 A fascinating study in itself, with the initial roots of Chomsky’s thought stemming from the early work of the Ancient 
Indian Sanskrit grammarian Pāṇini (http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1825/18250150.htm). 
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Martian scientist would surely conclude that aside from their mutually unintelligible vocabularies, 
Earthlings speak a single language.” (pg. 232). 
Such reasoning also led to the adoption of natural language being composed of a formal language, 
where a generative grammar will apply a certain set of rules in sentence formation, regardless of its 
meaning (Chomsky, 1957).  For instance, it is often argued humans organise phrases into hierarchical 
structures, such that in natural languages “*...+ the noun phrases and the verb phrase within a clause 
typically receive their grammatical role (e.g., subject or object) by means of hierarchical relations 
rather than through the bare linear order of words in a string *my emphasis+” (Musso et al., 2003, 
pg. 774). This relationship can be broken down into even smaller segments (which Chomsky 
distinguished as substantive universals), with noun phrases, for instance, consisting of a determiner 
preceding a noun (Chomsky, 1957). Importantly, Chomsky (1957) claims these rules exist without the 
need for interaction in other linguistic domains. Take for example his now famous phrase of 
“Colourless green ideas sleep furiously.” (ibid, pg. 15). Despite being syntactically correct, it is argued 
the sentence as a whole is semantically meaningless. 
The last major point in explaining the innatist position comes from child language acquisition. 
Specifically, Chomsky’s poverty of the stimulus conundrum: how are children able to acquire a fully 
expressive language, despite receiving noisy and incomplete amount of input data (Chater & 
Christiansen, in press)? In opposition to Skinner’s (1967) concept of verbal behaviour, and the 
behaviourist tradition more generally, Chomsky claims the universal properties of languages are 
explained by a genetically encoded language acquisition device (LAD), which contains a set of 
discreet, preconfigured rules that are then brought to the task of learning. 
Even with these general considerations, the conceptual basis of UG varies quite substantially across 
different traditions, ranging from Principles and Parameter Theory (Chomsky & Lasnik, 1993), the 
Minimalist Program (Chomsky, 1995) and Simpler Syntax (Pinker & Jackendoff, 2009). Without 
becoming entangled in the debate between these strains of thinking (for a good overview, see 
Christiansen & Chater, 2008), the important point to take away is that the mechanisms for acquiring 
language are innately encoded by neurobiological constraints. Still, even if we take for granted the 
innatist perspective in explaining the structure and acquisition of language, an additional 
explanation is required to understand how this putative language module arose in the first place. 
Of the many biological explanations in linguistics (see Gould and Lewontin’s exaptation/spandrel 
(1979) notions of language evolution), a highly influential hypothesis is that of Pinker & Bloom 
(1990), which claims the language module displays all the hallmarks of being an adaptive trait, and 
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as such it “*...+ would be natural, then, to expect everyone to agree that human language is the 
product of Darwinian natural selection. The only successful account of the origin of complex 
biological structure is the theory of natural selection” (ibid, pg. 707). 
Under this assumption our minds are very much like organs, consisting of functionally specialised 
machinery known as a module (see Cosmides & Tooby, 1997; Pinker, 2002). Like our hearts and 
livers, which evolved to pump blood and detoxify blood respectively (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997), our 
brain contains neural circuitry specialised for a whole host of specific processes, including certain 
design features of language. For instance, Pinker (2003) views compositionality as being functionally 
advantageous, and as such would have been biologically selected for as it offers a reproductive pay-
off (also see Nowak, 2000). Yet what about those feature which do not appear to be functionally 
advantageous? Indeed, even Chomsky (2005) himself claims many features of language are arbitrary, 
arguing some abstract properties of UG may actually impinge upon the communicative efficacy of 
language.  
There are many explanations for how arbitrary properties of language may become hardwired into 
our biological makeup, most notably via the Baldwin effect: “*where+ characteristics that are initially 
learned or developed over the lifespan can become gradually encoded in the genome over many 
generations, because organisms with a stronger predisposition to acquire a trait have a selective 
advantage” (Christiansen & Chater, 2009, pg. 1015). Computational modelling by Christian & Chater 
(2009) and Smith & Kirby (2008) offer some counter arguments to the plausibility of the Baldwin 
effect moulding a language-specific module, with the central thrust of their claims being the rate at 
which language changes: language is a moving target, and is arguably too fast for any biological 
adaptation to arise. Still, there are instances where fluctuating environmental systems fall into 
relatively stable patterns, which allow adaptive genetic processes to work (Barton, 2007; Hawks et 
al., 2007). Such arguments are used to explain links between cultural rates of change and biology 
(Hawks et al., 2007). So, why can we not make the same claims about language? For instance, 
Lieberman et al. (2007) show the rate of regularisation correlates with verb frequency, with “the 
slowest-changing words... replaced at rates comparable to the fastest-changing genes.” (Fitch, 2008, 
pg. 374).  
Regardless of whether or not biological evolution could account for a language-specific module, the 
question is whether it did happen. We can indirectly investigate these claims by asking another 
question: are these features of language accounted for by processes outside of biology? 
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2.2.2. Beyond Biology: Socio-cultural factors 
As we have already touched upon in this chapter: under the stewardship of Pinker, Chomsky and 
others, the origin, evolution and acquisition of language is primarily seen as a biological question to 
be answered. Whilst it is certain that biology plays a role in the evolution of language, its exact 
purpose is still contentious in light of a whole host of arguments emerging from research into 
cognitive, developmental, cultural and social traditions. Not only are the foundations of language 
universals (Evans & Levinson, 2009), natural language as a formal language (Deacon, 1997) and 
poverty of the stimulus (Pullum & Scholz, 2002), being challenged at both a theoretical and empirical 
level, but the recent resurgence of social and cultural factors in explaining language structure (Smith 
& Kirby, 2008; Lupyan & Dale, in press), language change (Kirby, 2000) and language acquisition 
(Chater & Christiansen, in press) are providing independent and alternative theories in our 
understanding. 
Considering the cultural and social influences of language is hardly new. Early work by the likes of 
Franz Boas (1911), Edward Sapir (1924) and Benjamin Whorf (1956) laid the groundwork for what 
would be later known as linguistic relativity: the view of language being inextricably intertwined with 
culture (Everett, 2009). Meanwhile, the development of sociolinguistics (Labov, 1966) and 
pragmatics (Grice, 1975) acknowledged that social dimensions influence linguistic behaviours (for 
introduction, see Tomasello, 2003). However, these early explorations into language and culture 
either could not counter the challenges of the cognitive revolution, or simply never gained any 
significant traction with which to begin. 
As already suggested, recent work over the past two decades is beginning to provide a significant 
and realistic alternative to the generative tradition. Looking at the structural properties of language 
is clearly a good place to highlight this distinction, given the recent mainstream attention received 
by Daniel Everett’s investigations into the Pirahã people (Everett, 2004; 2009). According to some 
accounts (ibid), this Amazonian hunter-gatherer tribe lack relative clauses and grammatical recursion 
in their language – the latter being a key component of one recent conception of UG (Chomsky, 
Hauser & Fitch, 2004). Although specific claims over the exact dimensions of the Pirahã language are 
still being disputed (see, Nevins et al., 2007 and Everett, 2007), Everett’s broader claims against 
language universals is receiving continuing support (Grace, 2002; Tomasello, 2003a) and empirical 
evidence (Wray & Grace, 2007; Evans & Levinson, 2009). 
In moving from the view of absolutes (all languages must have aspect X) to statistical (most 
languages are likely to have aspect X) (see Evans & Levinson, 2009), it is easy to see how the 
argument from generative linguistics begins to fall down: without linguistic universals, there is no 
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need for an innately-constrained universal grammar device7. After all, “*...+ such a property could be 
due to properties of other mental capacities – memory, action control, sensory integration, etc. 
Second, it could be due to overall design requirements of communication systems.” (Evans & 
Levinson, 2009, pg. 24). 
In highlighting the differences in structure across the spectrum of languages, the renewed emphasis 
of socio-cultural linguists is to explain these differences. Lupyan (in press), and others (Wray & 
Grace, 2007), have reported a distributional pattern of structures across the world’s languages, with 
“strong relationships between linguistic factors related to morphological complexity and 
demographic/socio-historical factors such as the number of language users, geographic spread, and 
degree of language contact.” (Lupyan & Dale, in press, pg. 2). Specifically, both Wray & Grace (2007) 
and Lupyan & Dale (in press) make a distinction between two types of instances in which languages 
are learned and used: exoteric and esoteric niches. An exoteric niche contains languages with a large 
variety of speakers, thus a pressure is asserted on the communal language to be suited for 
communication between strangers (Lupyan & Dale, in press). English, Swahili and Hindi are all 
examples of languages emerging from exoteric niches, in that they are more likely to “(1) be non-
native speakers or have learned the language from non-native speakers, (2) use the language to 
speak to outsiders – individual from different ethnic and/or linguistic backgrounds” (ibid, pg. 7). 
Conversely, exoteric niches are composed of languages like Tatar, Elfdalian and Algonquin (ibid). All 
of these languages belong to relatively small populations – individuals are part of a tightly knit 
community, based on a shared cultural and social identity. 
Given these differing linguistic niches, Lupyan and Dale’s main proposal is that the morphological 
features of a language are the product of adaptation to learning constraints and the communicative 
requirements of the speaker population. Therefore, a language being subjected to a greater number 
of outside learners, for instance, via colonization or large-scale migration, is thus under a greater 
pressure to become learnable – and subsequently simplifies its morphology and increases its 
productivity of existing grammatical patterns (ibid). Languages in exoteric niches also become more 
analytical, which according to Wray & Grace (2007) increases their compositionality in that 
“meanings of expressions can be determined from their composition, because the system 
approximates a one-to-one relationship between forms and meanings.” (pg. 9). Furthermore, Wray 
& Grace (2007) claim given the dynamics of these niches, language must have originally evolved in 
esoteric communities. On the basis of these assertions, Carstairs-McCarthy (2005) notes: “It 
therefore becomes an open question whether what linguists take for granted as grammatical 
                                                             
7 Even though this does not necessarily mean there is no such device. 
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universals (even such fundamental features as recursion) may be not biologically based but rather 
cultural add-ons, resulting from millennia of increasingly exoteric language use.” (pg. 508).   
2.2.3. Domain-general cognitive constraints 
Given the arguments presented thus far, it is becoming increasingly indisputable that socio-cultural 
factors are at work in accounting for linguistic structure. Suffice to say, this certainly weakens the 
position of language being purely a cognitive phenomenon, yet it does not completely rule out the 
possibility of an innate acquisition devise being responsible for the structural properties of language. 
One such problem in removing the dependency on solely biological explanations is the logical 
problem of language acquisition: that children become competent users of language, despite having 
an incomplete and noisy input (Kirby, 1999; Chater & Christiansen, in press). 
According to Chater & Christiansen, an alternative to the competing views of adaptationists and non-
adaptationists is that the “fit between the neural mechanisms supporting language and the structure 
of language itself is better explained in terms of how language adapted to the human brain, rather 
than vice versa.” (2009, pg. 3). Specifically, they adopt the general view of language being a product 
of multiple constraints; an evolving system, with features of language emerging from repeated 
processes of acquisition and transmission across continuous generations of language users (see 
Deacon, 1997; Kirby & Hurford, 2002; Tomasello, 2003; Christiansen & Chater, 2008). 
 Working from this basis, Christiansen & Chater make two important points concerning the cognitive 
acquisition of language. First, language is shaped by a range of domain-general cognitive features, 
including: perceptuo-motor8, learning and processing mechanisms9, constraints from thought10, and 
pragmatic constraints. Second, and perhaps more importantly, they outline two induction scenarios 
facing a child – coordination with others (C-induction) and understanding and manipulating the 
natural world (N-induction) – arguing that C-induction is easier and more likely to be the process by 
which a child acquires language (ibid). 
The utility of C-induction with language is appropriately characterised by coordinating our 
predictions with others in the speech-community. What is crucial is not which “phonological, 
syntactic or semantic regularities children prefer, when confronted with linguistic data; it is that they 
prefer the same linguistic regularities – each generation follows in the footsteps of the last.” (ibid, 
pg. 8). But even if we take the position of language adapting to our mind, it is essentially adapting to 
                                                             
8 The constraints arising from our motor and perceptual machinery, most notably the seriality of our vocal tract causes a 
sequential ordering of language.   
9 Learning, processing and memory all place constraints on our ability to acquire a language. 
10 According to Christiansen & Chater, “The structure of mental representation and reasoning must, we suggest, have a 
fundamental impact on the nature of language” (pg. 6). 
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a mind of imperfect construction, or as Marcus (2008) puts it, our language mechanisms were “*...+ 
built, rapidly, on a haphazard patchwork of mechanisms that originally evolved for other purposes.” 
(pg. 122).  
Therefore, the cognitive architecture underlying the processing of language is likely to be the 
product of natural selection and developmental processes. For instance, pre-linguistic features such 
as sequential processing (Christiansen & Delvin, 1997) and working-memory (Fiebach et al., 2005) 
undoubtedly influence our processing of language, yet it is unlikely these features were exclusively 
selected for language – rather, they are domain-general and probably selected on their functional 
flexibility (Chater & Christiansen, in press). This somewhat moves away from a common delineation 
offered by Kirby & Hurford (2002), with language sitting at three complex, dynamical systems: 
biological evolution, cultural transmission, and individual learning. As Ferdinand & Zuidema (2008) 
highlight, this tripartite separation is partially misleading “*...+ because it implies that evolution acts 
directly on learning as an adaptive system. This view essentially deletes cognition from the picture, 
because it is the embodied cognitive agent that ultimately roots its high-level process of language 
induction within the biologically evolved wet-ware that is the true processor of language.” (pg. 3). 
Still, Kirby & Hurford’s central tenant remains: language is not solely a biological problem to probe, 
but rather a conundrum comprised of many factors. 
2.2.3. Language as a complex adaptive system 
Thus far, the argument laid out is that the constraints of language arise from two systems: “the 
embodied cognitive agent and the socio-cultural system in which these agents communicate with 
one another.” (Ferdinand & Zuidema, 2008, pg.2).  Amalgamating these perspectives of language 
being shaped by human interaction and domain-general cognition is a strong argument for moving 
away from the static system of grammatical principles embodied by the generativist position, and 
towards a new paradigm of language being a complex adaptive system (CAS) (Beckner et al., 2009). 
First coined by Holland (1998), CAS are like other complex systems11 in that they exhibit emergent 
properties as a result of multiple interconnected elements. What differentiates CAS is its ability to 
adapt: these systems can learn from past experiences, and subsequently change their behaviour as a 
result (ibid). Such instances of CAS are found throughout nature, from social insects and ecosystems 
to immune systems and cellular mechanisms (Ahmed, Elgazzar & Hegazi, 2005). More importantly, 
these adaptive systems are used to explain the properties of human social endeavours, including: 
stock markets, communities and political parties (ibid). 
                                                             
11 Such as chaotic and non-linear systems. 
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Language displays all the hallmarks of being a CAS: “(1) The system consists of multiple agents (the 
speakers in the speech community) interacting with one another. (2) The system is adaptive, that is, 
speakers’ behavior is based on their past interactions, and current and past interactions together 
feed forward into future behavior. (3) A speaker’s behavior is the consequence of competing factors 
ranging from perceptual mechanics to social motivations. (4) The structures of language emerge 
from interrelated patterns of experience, social interaction, and cognitive processes.” (Beckner et 
al., 2009, pg. 3). 
Critically, this view places the existence of language at two inter-dependent junctures, consisting of 
an idiolect (the individual language user) and the communal language (the community of users). 
Both of these aspects are emergent, with an idiolect emerging from each individual’s use of their 
language through interactions with other individuals enmeshed in the community, and the 
communal language being the product of the interactions of all the idiolects (ibid).  
These two distinct but connected levels provide a myriad of features and explanations in truly 
understanding language as a whole, dynamic system. For instance, the inherent diversity between 
individuals dictates that there is no idealised notion of a speaker-hearer, with each individual’s 
unique linguistic experience resulting in heterogeneous idiolects (Weinreich, Labov, & Herzog, 1968; 
Bybee, 2006). But this is not all – language is in a constant state of flux at both the level of communal 
and idiolect (Beckner et al., 2009); it adapts through an upward spiral of competing factors (see 
speaker-listener conflict: Chater & Christiansen, in press); small phenotypic differences in humans 
(vocal tract control, shared attention, memory capacity, etc) can build up and result in a phase 
transition (Elman, 2005); the immersion, sensitivity and dependency of language users in social 
networks (Lupyan, in press); and the view of language being a form of cultural adaptation to both 
the human mind (Christiansen & Chater, 2008) and the transmission vector (Cornish, Tamariz & 
Kirby, in press). 
2.4. Summary 
The literature thus far can be summarised as follows: 
 Language is made up of many design features, with the powerful combination of 
semanticity, productivity and traditional transmission being the fundamental features in 
distinguishing human language from other forms of communication (Hockett, 1960); 
 Although these features result in a communication system of open-ended expressivity, the 
central question dogging researchers is: how did these features of language come to be this 
way?; 
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 This question elicits a whole host of answers, with those coming from a generative position 
generally opting for biological explanations; specifically that humans are born with a 
language acquisition device (Chomsky, 1980). Furthermore, some scholars (Pinker & Bloom, 
1980) claim the only viable explanation for the existence of this language device is through 
the theory of natural selection; 
 However, a large body of literature offers a whole host of counter claims against the 
existence of language universals (Evans & Levinson, 2009), poverty of the stimulus (Pullum & 
Scholz, 2002) and natural language being a formal, computational system (Deacon, 1997); 
 Heeding these apparent flaws in generativist explanations, alternative approaches are 
gaining traction: e.g. emphasising the role of socio-cultural factors (Luypan & Dale, in press) 
and the influence of domain-general cognitive constraints (Chater & Christiansen, in press); 
 Finally, in moving away from language being viewed as a static, monolithic entity, the 
position taken by this dissertation is that language is a complex adaptive system, comprised 
of many interlocking parts (Beckner et al., 2009). 
Seeking a solitary exposition for language is not a fruitful, or even possible, task. That so many 
features are intertwined in an inextricable system is something to see as liberating, instead of 
disparaging. For instance, by exploring language through socio-cultural and domain-general 
cognition, a picture emerges where language is adapting to the vast linguistic environment in which 
it is being learned and used (Lupyan & Dale, 2009). As such, some of the features of language may be 
explained via multiple constraints stemming from “different learnability and communication 
pressures.” (ibid, pg. 18). Languages then, not only undergo a process of gradual drifting until they 
become mutually unintelligible, they also adapt in response to any significant pressures that are 
present. Our role as linguists is to see what constraints play a significant role in shaping the features 
of language? Two obvious candidates are culture and the transmission vector, from which we can 
pose this question: how does cultural transmission influence, and interact with, language? 
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Chapter Three 
Language as a culturally transmitted product 
3.1. Culture as an evolutionary system 
3.1.1. Variation, Fitness & Inheritance 
Humans are immersed in culture from birth. It is so fundamental to our experience, and what it 
means to be human itself, yet many attempts to explain our behaviour frequently begets biology as 
the answer. But first, what exactly is culture? A generally accepted definition places culture as 
“information12 capable of affecting individuals’ behaviour that they acquire from other members of 
their species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmission” (Richerson & Boyd, 
2005, pg. 5). 
Like the evolution of biological organisms, culture too can be viewed as following three Darwinian 
principles (1859): variation, differential fitness, and inheritance (Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008). It is an 
evolutionary system subject to the selective and non-selective forces (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 
1981; Boyd & Richerson, 1985) Darwin wrote about in The Origin of Species: that there is a vast 
amount of variation within a species, which he argued led to selection for particular traits, and that 
these traits were then inherited by successive generations. When looking at the spread of culture, 
Mesoudi et al. (2004) claimed there was evidence for all three of these processes. For instance, of 
the 6-8000 languages spoken throughout the world (Evans & Levinson, 2009) there is a considerable 
amount of variation. Meanwhile, cultural selection is taking place at many levels and is the result of 
many factors, including cognitive constraints in memory, attention and expression (Mesoudi, Whiten 
& Laland, 2006). Lastly, Mesoudi, Whiten & Laland (ibid) identify the inheritance “of successful 
cultural traits has been demonstrated in numerous studies of transmission of skills and beliefs in 
traditional societies... and in studies of social learning in children.” (pg. 331-2). 
Thanks to the early works of cultural evolutionists, researchers are not only drawing cursory parallels 
with biological evolution; they are actively using mathematical models derived from population 
genetics (see Richerson & Boyd, 2005) to investigate the inheritance of cultural traits and the role 
social learning plays in enhancing the overall fitness of a population by allowing “*...+ learned 
improvements to accumulate from one generation to the next” (Boyd & Richerson, 1994, pg. 134). 
Known as cumulative cultural evolution (Caldwell & Millen, 2008) or the ratchet effect (Tomasello, 
                                                             
12 Information is a catchall term for ideas, knowledge, beliefs, values, skills, and attitudes (see Mesoudi, Whiten & Laland, 
2006). 
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1999), this process “*...+ requires not only creative invention but also, and just as importantly, 
faithful social transmission that can work as a ratchet to prevent slippage backward – so that the 
newly invented artifact or practice preserves its new and improved form at least somewhat faithfully 
until a further modification or improvement comes along.” (Tomasello, 1999, pg. 5).   
3.1.2. Cultural Transmission 
Just as Darwin struggled when conceptualising an adequate method of inheritance from one 
generation to another (Mesoudi & Whiten, 2004), those studying cultural evolution arguably have an 
even greater task to provide an explanation of the transmission vectors. Unlike genetic transmission, 
we are still only beginning to understand the relative impacts of horizontal (peer-to-peer 
transmission), oblique (parent generation to non-kin offspring) and vertical transmission (from 
parent to offspring) (see Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Greenhill et al., 2009); the varying ways in 
which culture is transmitted (Henrich & Boyd, 2002); the role of population dynamics (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985); and, interactions between cultural transmission, individual learning and genetics 
(Aoki et al. 2005).  
Nonetheless, cultural transmission is a vital aspect of cultural evolution – yet our poor understanding 
probably stems from the varying ways in which culture is transmitted (Mesoudi, 2004).  
Memes are frequently held as a catchall solution to being the cultural transmission particulate, with 
the study of memetics being an analogous concept to genetics. First coined by Dawkins (1976), the 
term meme13 was a way of extending the idea of replicator-centred evolution into the realm of 
culture – that replicators are universal. Since then, memetics has been picked up and expanded 
upon by several researchers (see Dennett, 1995; Blackmore, 1999; Aunger, 2000), which rests on a 
common assumption that “cultural knowledge is stored in brains as discrete packages of semantic 
information, comparable to how biological information is stored as genes. Once expressed in 
behaviour or artifacts, these packages of learned information can be replicated in the heads of other 
individuals through social learning.” (Mesoudi, Whiten & Laland, 2006, pg. 342). 
However, the concept of memes is a fuzzy term, and some researchers argue against the need for 
any one particulate being responsible for all forms of cultural transmission (Mesoudi, Whiten & 
Laland, 2006). As Mesoudi (2004) argues, the lack of understanding as to the transmission 
particulate, assuming it even exists in a particulate form, is not necessarily an insurmountable 
problem for those wishing to study cultural evolution. We are still very capable of understanding the 
roles of population dynamics and the interactions between genes and culture (ibid). 
                                                             
13 Meme is merely a unit of cultural inheritance, analogous to gene (Mesoud, Whiten & Laland, 2006).  
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Much of the early advances in population genetics pre-empted Watson and Crick’s unveiling of the 
structure of DNA – and the subsequent explosion in molecular biology. Mathematical models by 
Fisher (1930), Wright (1931) and Haldane (1932) laid the groundwork for unifying Darwinian natural 
selection with Mendellian inheritance, which defined evolution as the change in the frequency of 
alleles in a population (Barton et al., 2007). More importantly, under the assumptions set out in the 
Hardy-Weinberg principle (Barton et al., 2007), population models can investigate evolutionary 
processes, such as natural selection and random genetic drift. As such, allele or genotype 
frequencies “in successive generations can be tracked mathematically to simulate the process of 
evolution, often to find out whether a particular genetic trait can invade and spread through a 
population, and if so, to explore the possible evolutionary consequences of this invasion.” (Mesoudi, 
Whiten & Laland, 2006, pg. 336).  
Co-opting population genetic methods for the study of culture often fall within the realm of two 
areas: cultural evolution and gene-culture coevolution (Mesoudi, Whiten & Laland, 2006). Already 
touched upon above, models of cultural evolution focus exclusively on the demographic processes of 
culture – highlighting the obvious parallels between cultural and biological evolution, whilst also 
accounting for aspects that “will generate evolutionary dynamics with no obvious parallel in 
biology.” (ibid, pg. 337). Meanwhile, gene-culture coevolution, also known as dual inheritance theory 
(DTI), attempts to unify both biological and cultural evolution within one theoretical framework. By 
considering both the transmission of genes and culture, DTI offers principles under which the 
selection certain cultural traits (be they adaptive or maladaptive) can interact with the selection of 
genetic traits, and vice versa (ibid). 
All of these examples point towards culture being an evolutionary system in its own right. Perhaps 
more importantly, however, is that like language, not all change in culture is the result of genetic 
drift. Rather, both systems are adaptive: they are shaped in response to their environment. Thus, 
considering the dynamic interplay between both of these evolutionary systems is imperative.    
3.2. Cultural Transmission and Language 
3.2.1. Investigations into language, evolution & culture 
Having established that both culture (§3.1) and language (§2.2.3) are evolutionary systems, the main 
question to now ask is: how can evolution and culture inform our understanding of language? 
Insights into the role of cultural transmission and language can come from a variety of perspectives. 
Historical linguistics, for instance, has readily adopted Dawkins’ concept of the replicators in applying 
selection to language change (see Croft, 2006; Ritt, 2004). Mufwene (2001) moves away from the 
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memeticist approach, and offers a model of language change where instead of focusing on 
linguemes as the vital replicators, he argues it is in fact the “survival, spread, or extinction of a 
language is dependent on the survival, spread, or extinction of its host speakers” (Croft, 2008, pg. 
223). Furthermore, Mufwene (2001) emphasises the role of populations, arguing that languages can 
be treated as a species in themselves – populations of idiolects existing inside a speaker-hearer 
environment. Essentially, his central thesis is that languages are parasitic in their nature, with 
humans being potential hosts for infection with multiple, and at times, competing, idolects (ibid).  
Not only are concepts in biology being borrowed for analogous processes in linguistics, but so are 
certain methodological approaches. Phylogenetic methods used to investigate the historical lineage 
of a species in biology, are now being applied to linguistic phenomena (see Pagel, Atkinson & 
Meade, 2007; Atkinson et al., 2008). Cavalli-Sforza and colleagues (1988) first brought to light the 
obvious connections between phylogeny and language history – producing phylogenies to compare 
human and linguistic populations. Although Cavalli-Sforza et al.’s results suggest the distribution of 
language families largely reflects demographic processes of human populations (such as migration) 
in pre-history, there is a degree of controversy surrounding their use of language families not 
“generally accepted among historical linguists” (Croft, 2008, pg. 225). 
Despite the initial disputes over the data used in Cavalli-Sforza et al.’s study, the application of 
phylogenetic trees has become widespread across studies in linguistics and culture. Notable studies 
using linguistic phylogenies include: the explore population movements in the Pacific (Gray et al., 
2009); how languages evolve in punctuational bursts (Atkinson et al., 2008); and, to investigate how 
the frequency of word-use predicts rates of lexical evolution (Pagel, Quentin & Meade, 2007). 
Furthermore, one paper by Greenhill and colleagues (2009) examines the role of different 
dimensions of transfer, asking: how influential is horizontal transmission in cultural phylogenies? 
Even though some critics (see Gould, 1987) argue horizontal transfer is ubiquitous throughout 
culture, the current study by Greenhill et al claim “*...+ that phylogenetic influence is remarkably 
robust to even high levels of borrowing... [and] while reticulation may be common in cultural 
evolution, it does not necessarily invalidate a phylogenetic approach.” (ibid, pg. 6). 
The theoretical and technical applications of biology have wider implications in understanding the 
fundamental foundations of language and its relationship with socio-cultural, cognitive and 
behavioural aspects. Given the vast quantity of literature in this area, ranging from that of linguistics 
(Chomsky, 1993; 1995; Deacon, 1997; Bickerton, 2003; Hurford, ) and animal behaviour (Dunbar & 
Shultz, 2007; Premack, 2007) to neurophysiology (Arbib, 2005) and computational modelling (Batali, 
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1998; Kirby, 2002), there are an even greater range of opinions as to how language evolved (for an 
extensive overview and introduction into all these areas, see Bickerton, 2007). 
One view to gain a significant foothold in the past decade stems from the idea of language being the 
product of symbol-manipulation and symbol-relations (Deacon, 1997). Under this view, language 
acquisition takes a central role, as Deacon explains: “Human children appear preadapted to guess 
the rules of syntax correctly, precisely because languages evolve so as to emobody in their syntax 
the most frequently guessed patterns. The brain has coevolved with respect to language, but 
languages have done most of the adapting” (ibid, pg. 122). As already outlined in the previous 
chapter (see section on domain-cognitive constraints), these views have received substantial support 
from the theoretical literature. However, one of the most prevalent methods of investigating 
language and culture is via computational modelling. 
3.2.2. Iterated Learning Model 
If we accept that language is not only a conveyer of cultural information, but it is itself a socially 
learned and culturally transmitted system (Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008), then an individual’s 
linguistic knowledge is the result of observing the linguistic behaviour of others (Hurford, 1990; 
Smith & Kirby, 2008). This well attested process of language acquisition is often termed Iterated 
Learning, and it opens up a new avenue to investigate the design features of language: that cultural, 
as opposed to biological, evolution is fundamental in understanding these features (Smith & Kirby, 
2008). 
Much of the literature regarding Iterated Learning focuses on a computational modelling approach, 
where “the central idea behind the ILM *Iterated Learning Model+ is to model directly the way 
language exists and persists via two forms of representation” (Kirby & Hurford, 2002, pg. 123). These 
two forms consist of an I-Language (the internal representation of language as a pattern of neural 
connections) and an E-Language (the external representation of language as sets of utterances) 
(Chomsky, 1986). This cycle of continued production and induction is used to understand how the 
evolution of structure emerges from non-linguistic communication systems (e.g. Batali, 1998; Kirby, 
1999; Kirby, 2001; Kirby & Hurford, 2002; Zuidema, 2003; Smith, 2005) and how language changes 
from one form into another (Niyogi & Berwick, 2007; Reali & Griffiths, 2009). 
To briefly summarise, these models contain a single agent who is taught an initial random language 
(consisting of mappings between meanings and signals). The output of the agent is then used to 
teach the next generation, and so on. After numerous generational turnovers of teachers and 
observers, some of these models provide an intriguing insight into the emergence of linguistic 
phenomena such as compositionality and regularity (Kirby & Hurford, 2002). Consistently, these 
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models are used to offer an alternative to biological accounts (e.g. Pinker & Jackendoff, 2009) in 
explaining the emergence of linguistic features, yet in some instances they also directly counter the 
role biological evolution plays in moulding a putative LAD (e.g. Smith & Kirby, 2008). 
3.2.3. The role of transmission and biases 
A common theme running through a wide array of these Iterated Learning studies emphasises 
language as being a compromise between two factors: “the biases of learners, and other constraints 
acting on language during their transmission.” (Smith, 2009, pg. 697). What is perhaps fundamental 
to this view is encapsulated in the second constraint: that the transmission is a mediating force in 
the shaping of language. For instance, Kirby & Hurford (2002) show how the infinite expressivity 
found in languages is a result of the finite set of data presented during acquisition. With this 
transmission bottleneck restricting the amount of data presented, learners must generalise in order 
to learn the data, but not to the extent where the language is one signal for all possible meanings. 
Tempering maximal expressivity with generalisation provides an adequate explanation for recursive 
compositionality (see Kirby & Hurford, 2002), without appealing to the need for an intricately 
specified LAD.  As Zuidema (2003) succinctly put it: “the poverty of the stimulus solves the poverty of 
the stimulus”. 
That the transmission and biases work in tandem in forcing languages to adapt suggests we cannot 
rely solely on cognitive explanations. To further investigate this relationship between transmission 
and biases, and due to criticisms concerning the bias towards a minimum description length (see 
Vogt, 2005a), recent models of iterated learning are frequently run with Bayesian agents (Griffiths & 
Kalish, 2005; Kirby & Smith, 2007; Dediu, 2009; Smith, 2009; Ferdinand & Zuidema, 2009). 
Essentially, by using Bayes’ theorem the role of learners is to select a hypothesis h on the basis of its 
posterior probability when exposed to data d: 
 
P(d|h) provides a statistical likelihood of the data d being produced under a certain hypothesis h, 
with P(h) equalling the prior probability of each hypothesis. When applied to models of language and 
iterated learning, both hypotheses are considered to be the set of possible grammars, whilst the 
data consists of sets of utterances required to induce a language (Smith, 2009). Importantly, the 
prior probability distribution over grammars is the learning bias, which may be domain-specific or 
domain-general (ibid).  
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A critical component of Bayesian learning, and still a point of contention, largely stems from two 
papers (Griffiths & Kalish, 2005; Kirby, Dowman & Griffiths, 2007) investigating the role of prior 
biases. Griffiths & Kalish show that if agents select a grammar with a probability proportional to its 
posterior probability, then the stationary distribution is merely a reflection of the prior distribution 
(Smith, 2009). By sampling from the posterior, the agents will revert to the prior regardless of any 
influence the transmission vector may assert, which as Smith (2009) states: “this suggests a 
transparent relationship between the prior bias of learners and the observed distribution of 
languages in the world: the typological distribution exactly reflects the biases of learners.” (pg. 698). 
Kirby  et al (2007), however, demonstrate that Griffiths & Kalish’s result was because the agents 
were samplers as opposed to another type of hypothesis selection: maximum a posterior (MAP 
selection, or maximisers). Instead of sampling from the posterior, maximisers choose the hypothesis 
with the highest posterior probability (Ferdiand & Zuidema, 2008). As such, MAP selection offers a 
more muddied picture of the relationship between learner biases and typological distributions, in 
that the distribution of languages will “reflect the ordering of hypotheses in the prior, but 
differences in prior probability are magnified, such that the a priori most likely hypothesis is 
overrepresented in the stationary distribution.” (Smith, 2009, pg. 698). This invariably leads to a 
situation where different priors can result in the same stationary distribution, and by varying the 
transmission factors (amount of data presented, the noise between signals and meanings etc) 
convergence is not always towards the prior (ibid). 
3.2.3. Iterated Learning and population dynamics 
In the ILMs discussed, each generation consists of a single individual. This limitation breeds two 
further problems: 1) only vertical transmission is modelled; and, 2) there is little variability in the 
input. First, by negating peer-to-peer (horizontal) learning, ILMs ignore a potentially vital mechanism 
in language acquisition (Swarup & Gasser, 2009). For instance, Harris (1998) claims the children of 
immigrants tend to more readily adopt the language and accent of their home country; the basis of 
which being that children identify with their peers (classmates etc), rather than their parents. 
Investigating horizontal transfer are several computational models (Batali, 1998; Vogt, 2005a; 
2005b; Swarup & Gasser, 2009), which highlight how population dynamics play a pivotal role in 
accounting for the emergence of highly structured languages. Vogt (2005), for instance, uses the 
iterated learning model to investigate symbol grounding, which is simply the notion that “the symbol 
may be viewed as a structural coupling between an agent’s sensorimotor activations and its 
environment.” (Vogt, 2002, pg. 429). Using a discrimination games framework, in which a pair of 
speakers and hearers are presented with a “context of a few geometrical shapes which differ in their 
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shapes and colors *sic+” (Swarup & Gasser, 2009, pg. 217), Vogt creates a scenario whereby a 
speaker selects a particular shape, and then describes it to the hearer. By comparing three aspects, 
based on whether the speaker’s chosen shape is revealed to the hearer before (observational game) 
or after (guessing game) communication, and the transmission dynamic (vertical versus horizontal), 
Vogt (2005a;2005b) reaches three general conclusions: 1) Single hearer-speaker dynamics in the 
observational condition converge on a compositional language; 2) increasing a population size to 
three agents results in compositionality being stable in just the guessing condition, with agents in 
the observational condition resulting in their compositional language being replaced by a holistic 
language; and, 3) the inclusion of peer learning in the model consistently produces stable 
compositional languages across both conditions, without the need for a transmission bottleneck.   
But what about our second criticism: that the ILM fails to account for variability in the input. When 
acquiring a language, children are not learning from a solitary source – they are being exposed to a 
whole host of sources and learning environments. With this in mind, claims for increased learnability 
being the result of an evolutionary pressure (see Smith, 2006) are limited: “An evolutionary pressure 
is always manifested through variation (creation of alternatives with differing fitness) and selection 
(fitness-based elimination of some alternatives).” (Swarup & Gasser, 2009, pg. 217). Niyogi & 
Berwick (2009) pick up on such limitations, and contrast the ILM with their own Social Learning (SL) 
paradigm, where each individual learner is exposed to data from multiple sources within a 
population. Using historical data, they show that their SL model “more faithfully replicates the 
dynamics of the evolution of Middle English [my emphasis]” (ibid, pg. 1), which is taken as evidence 
that IL is deficient in two fundamental aspects: (1) it cannot explain language stability over time, and 
(2) its linear dynamics do not account for phase transitions (ibid). 
Regardless of Niyogi & Berwick’s specific criticisms concerning language change, they do raise an 
important point about learning from multiple sources. Yet this point is not an inherent weakness of 
Iterated Learning process, as suggested by the authors, but it is instead a weakness of the single 
agent models. Indeed, this is position taken by three recent papers (Dediu, 2009; Smith, 2009; 
Ferdinand & Zuidema, 2009) which examine population dynamics in the context of Bayesian and 
iterated learning. 
Smith (2009), for instance, looks at the implications for a Bayesian learner learning from two 
different sources of grammar. Called the two-grammar model, agents at each generation are 
exposed to data produced by multiple individuals. As already discussed, the findings of Griffiths and 
Kalish (2007) and Kirby et al. (2007) highlight differences resulting from single teacher-learner chains 
of samplers and a posteriori maximisers: to reiterate, the former converges to the prior genetic bias, 
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while the dynamic is more complex for learners utilising the latter maximising strategy. By 
introducing diversity into the model, Smith’s main result is that, after cultural evolution has run its 
course, and regardless of whether or not agents are maximisers or samplers, each grammar “is no 
longer the same as the prior distribution. Rather, one language predominates, with the winning 
language being determined by the starting proportions of the two grammars and their prior 
probability.” (pg. 699). 
However, as Smith concedes, the model does not really expand much beyond previous Bayesian 
ILMs, other than introducing multiple individuals into a vertically transmitted chain. Ferdinand & 
Zuidema (2009) and Dediu (2009) create relatively complex and dynamic models that not only 
consider population size, but population heterogeneity: agents in a population do not always have 
the same genetic biases. For example, Ferdinand & Zuidema introduce a great deal of variability into 
their model, including “the prior, hypothesis structure, bottleneck size, hypothesis choice strategy, 
population size, and population heterogeneity in terms of different priors per agent.” (2009, pg. 
1788). After replicating the results from previous single chain, or to use their term, monadic, 
Bayesian ILMs (specifically, Griffiths & Kalish, 2005; Kirby, Dowman & Griffiths, 2007), their main 
results in polyadic (multi-agent) populations is that by just increasing the population size to 2, the 
“sampler model’s stationary distribution does not strictly mirror the prior.” (Ferdinand & Zuidema, 
2009, pg. 1790). This is true regardless of whether the population is heterogeneous or 
homogeneous, but it also means the differentiation between sampler and maximiser models is not 
as distinct as in monadic chains. In fact, both polyadic maximisers and polyadic samplers tend to 
behave similarly to monadic maximisers, with heterogeneous agents’ hypotheses choices converging 
“as they are allowed to share more and more data, despite having fixed and different priors from 
each other.” (ibid, pg. 1789).  
In contrast to both Ferdiand & Zuidema (2009) and Smith (2009), Dediu (2009) finds that by 
enlarging the population to two agents, and adding heterogeneous biases,  the apparent differences 
between samplers and maximisers are diluted. Furthermore, in the case of chains consisting of both 
sample and maximiser pairs, the results tend to mirror those found in single chains of samplers: 
convergence towards the prior. Lastly, on the basis of a previous study (Dediu, 2008), Dediu then 
shows how in general, non-Bayesian heterogeneous “learners with very different genetic biases do 
converge on a common language.” (pg. 2).     
It seems all three authors tend to converge on the somewhat diplomatic suggestion that it is too 
early to draw any strong conclusions concerning the interplay between biases and cultural 
transmission. Despite the conflicting results regarding the prior biases, with Dediu claiming agents 
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do tend to converge towards the prior whilst Ferdiand & Zuidema (2009) and Smith (2009) find the 
opposite, the general consensus supports “the view that the process of cultural transmission plays a 
very important mediating role” (Dediu, 2009, pg. 9).  
3.3. Experimental studies into the origin and evolution of language 
structure 
3.3.1. Diffusion chain experiments 
Up to this point, the literature pertaining to iterated learning comes from computational models of 
human communication, and is therefore inherently limited in the conclusions drawn in relation to 
real human population. Of course, the general point of modelling is to abstract away from the 
subject matter – focusing on the aspects deemed important (Hurford, 2005). But as Bickerton (2003) 
notes, “Powerful and potentially interesting although this approach is, its failure to incorporate more 
realistic conditions (perhaps because these would be difficult to simulate) sharply reduces any 
contribution it might make toward unravelling language evolution. So far, it is a classic case of 
looking for your car-keys where street-lamps are” (pg. 522). 
Instead, recent approaches to language evolution (see Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008) focus on uniting 
two apparently disparate strands of research: mathematical/computational modelling and 
experimental studies. The latter is somewhat lacking in regards to cultural and linguistic evolutionary 
research, with perhaps the closest experimental paradigm to iterated learning coming from the field 
of social psychology, in particular the use of serial transmission (diffusion) chains (Mesoudi & 
Whiten, 2008). Originally created by Barlett (1932) to investigate the role of memory, diffusion 
chains are comparable to the children’s game of Chinese whispers: here, some sort of cultural 
material (usually a sentence or phrase) is passed along a linear chain of individuals (see figure 1), 
until it reaches the final person. At this point, the sentence or phrase is normally different to its 
original incarnation, having accrued errors due to repeated retellings.  
Early experiments by Barlett and examined a whole host of material, from Native American folktales 
to descriptions of sporting events (see Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008). Interestingly, in each of these 
studies the original material retained its overall meaning once reaching the end of the chain, but 
through repeated retellings along successive participants, the material also displayed two consistent 
factors of change: 1) the material became much shorter in length, and 2) the material lost much of 
its original detail (ibid). Barlett also observed what he believed to be evidence for memory being 
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reconstructive (see Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008), with cultural material becoming distorted through a 
process of conforming to pre-existing mental schemas14. 
 
Figure 1.  An example of a linear diffusion chain. 
Recent studies using diffusion chains have further supported Barlett’s claims of generalisation 
(Mesoudi & Whiten, 2004), whilst also investigating his claims of assimilation, such as pre-existing 
gender stereotypes (Bangerter, 2000) and prior cognitive biases (Reali & Griffiths, 2009). The chains 
have also been adapted to investigate foraging techniques of chimpanzees and children (Horner et 
al., 2006), the transmission of social learning techniques in chimpanzee tool use (Hopper et al., 
2007), and observing the establishment of a wild-type song culture in zebra finch (Fehér et al., 2009).  
The general findings of all these studies demonstrate that humans of all ages, non-human primates, 
and even non-human animals are all capable of high-fidelity cultural transmission – and this can be 
studied empirically. Yet, to apply this framework for human language, another set of experimental 
literature needs to be considered, namely: artificial language learning and constructed 
communication systems. 
3.3.2. Experimental studies of communication 
Artificial Language Learning  
First devised by Esper (1925), and later expanded to study social transmission (Esper, 1966), Artificial 
Language Learning (ALL) involves exposing participants to an artificially created, miniature language, 
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which they are then trained, and subsequently tested, on; the goal being to investigate the learning 
capabilities of individuals. The ALL paradigm is widely used in linguistics, especially when 
investigation language acquisition and statistical learning abilities of humans (Saffran et al., 1996) 
and non-humans (Fitch & Hauser, 2004). 
For instance, Wonnacott and colleagues (2007) use an ALL to explore two related debates 
surrounding verb generalisation: 1) how some verb-argument structures tend to generalise to new 
verbs, whilst other verbs are highly resistant to change; and, 2) how verb-specific and more 
generalised constraints interact in sentence processing, with emphasis on the role of semantics 
(ibid). They find that by using languages without semantic cues to verb distribution, learners are 
quite competent in acquiring “both verb-specific and verb-general patterns, based on distributional 
information in the linguistic input regarding each of the verbs as well as across the language as a 
whole” (ibid, pg. 165). 
ALL is also useful in expanding upon computational modelling studies, as demonstrated by 
Christiansen (2000) when, working from a previous connectionist study into word order universals 
(Christiansen & Devlin, 1997), created two head-ordered languages, with one containing head-last 
consistent sentences and the other being inconsistent. In tandem with the modelling results, the ALL 
study confirmed that head-order inconsistency is too hard to learn, which suggests that the 
underlying processing mechanisms are not necessarily innately constrained with a head-ordering 
rule, but are rather the result of “non-linguistic constraints on sequential learning and processing” 
(Christiansen, 2000, pg. 4). 
Another area of investigation using ALL is in the emergence and formation of creoles from pidgin 
languages (Hudson-Kam & Newport, 2005) – a hybrid language that evolves from its parent pidgin, 
except it contains a grammar that mirrors the complexity of natural languages (Hall, 1966). Although 
we can see creoles emerge within a few generations, – such as the development of a new type of 
sign language in a deaf community of Nicaraguan children (Senghas, Kita & Ozyurek, 2004) and a 
similar situation in development of the Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language (see Sandler et al., 2005) – 
these studies fail to “provide us with the experimental control to test our predictions” (Cornish, 
2006, pg. 9). 
Hudson-Kam & Newport (2005) attempt to address creole formation by exposing both adults and 
children to two artificial languages, specifically focusing on the role of regularization: the process of 
making irregular forms regular. Importantly, these initial languages contained linguistic features 
present in pidgins and the early stages of creole formation, such as inconsistent grammatical 
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morphemes – and differed in the presence or absence of a determiner within noun phrases. For the 
first language (inconsistent condition) the determiner was only present for 60% of the time, whilst it 
was present 100% in the other language (consistent condition). They found that exposure to 
consistent grammatical patterns resulted in consistent grammatical patterns for both adults and 
children. The major finding, however, is that when adults are exposed to inconsistent input, they 
tend to reproduce these inconsistencies in their output; children on the other hand tend to 
regularize the language “imposing patterns that were not the same as their input.” (ibid, pg. 151). 
From these results, Hudson-Kam & Newport claim that, through the regularisation of grammatical 
patterns, children play a vital role in creole formation. Furthermore, given that children and adults 
do not learn the inconsistent input in the same manner, with the latter applying a strategy that 
merely attempts to reproduce consistency or inconsistency, children act as a way to “regularize and 
stabilize the grammar of an emerging language” (pg. 185). 
A more recent study on word learning (Vouloumanos, 2008) investigated the interactions between 
learning biases and input inconsistency. Specifically, Vouloumanous trained participants on novel 
word-object pairs consisting of varying frequencies: “some objects were paired with one word, other 
objects with multiple words with differing frequencies (ranging from 10% to 80%)” (2008, pg. 729). 
She tested participants by presenting them with two objects while playing a single word, and then 
asking which of the two objects are best associated with the word. By introducing multiple-referent 
relations during word learning, Vouloumanous found participants tended to adopt a selection 
heuristic based on the frequency of the word/object, rather than regularising the inconsistent input. 
In her conclusion, she argues that the sensitivity to the statistical co-occurrence between words and 
objects suggests, “*...+ learners could entertain overlapping hypotheses about the referents of a 
word, and assign different likelihoods to each of these candidate mappings” (Vouloumanous, 2008, 
pg. 739). 
Intentional Communication Experiments  
Sharing similarities with ALL experiments is a comparatively small body of literature pertaining to 
experiments into the construction of communication systems (Galantucci, 2005; Selten & Warglien, 
2007). A common theme running through each of these experiments is how a novel communication 
can emerge over a short period of time to solve a particular task (Galantucci, 2005) or just through 
repeated interaction (Selten & Warglien, 2007).  
Selten & Warglien (2007), for instance, use a series of laboratory experiments designed to 
investigate the inherent costs and benefits of linguistic communication – and how these respective 
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aspects affect the emergence of basic languages in a coordination task. There is no common 
language available to the participants, with them instead needing to create their own 
communication system in reference to varying lists of geometrical figures composed of up to three 
features. Importantly, the communication system is limited, as using letters had a cost attached. By 
varying number of letters available and the set of figures, the researchers are able to compare 
different environments – with stable environments resulting in arbitrary codes, whilst “in an 
environment with novelty, compositional grammars offer considerable coordination advantages and 
therefore are more likely to arise.” (pg.7361). 
Although both Selten & Warglien (2007) and Galantucci (2005) show how repeated interactions 
result in the emergence of compositionality, a vital component of these experiments is that the 
participants create a system of communication. Thus, the resulting systems are the product of 
intentional design, and as such cannot tell us much about the actual processes of language, which, as 
discussed at the start of this chapter, “is an “invisible hand” process leading to phenomena that are 
the result of human action but not intentional artifacts” (Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008, pg. 10681).  
3.3.3. Human Iterated Learning 
Drawing from these experimental approaches found in diffusion chain (Mesoudi, Whiten & Dunbar, 
2006; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008) and ALL (Christiansen, 2000; Fitch & Hauser, 2004) studies, 
Kirby et al (2008) show that as a consequence of intergenerational transmission “languages 
transmitted culturally evolve in such a way as to maximize their own transmissibility: over time, the 
languages in our experiments become easier to learn and increasingly structured.” (pg. 10681). In 
these experiments a subject is exposed to an alien language, which is made up of two elements 
within a finite space: meanings (consisting of a picture with three discernable elements: colour, 
shape and movement) paired with signals (consisting of a string of letters). Importantly, the subject 
is only exposed to a set amount of meanings (SEEN items), after which they are then presented with 
a group of meanings (some SEEN, some UNSEEN) without the corresponding signal – the goal being 
that they provide a signal (be it the correct version or not). On completion of forming the meaning-
signal pairs the experiment is repeated, except this time the new subjects are trained on the data 
provided by the previous generation. This continues until the experiment is finished, which in the 
scenario discussed here happened at generation ten (Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008). 
For their paper, Kirby et al. (ibid) run two experiments. The first is essentially identical to the above 
description, with a set of 27 string-picture pairs being divided into two sets: the SEEN set (14 string-
picture pairs) and the UNSEEN set (13 string-picture pairs). In the second experiment however, the 
SEEN set was filtered before being presented to the next generation:  
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“Specifically, if any string labeled more than 1 picture, all but 1 of those string-picture pairs 
(chosen at random) was moved into the UNSEEN set. As a result, the training data seen by 
participants in the second experiment consisted of a purely 1-to-1 mapping from strings to 
pictures, even if the language of the previous generation included 1-to-many mappings.” 
(ibid, pg. 10686).  
As already mentioned, the results generally show the languages become increasingly structured 
coupled with an easing of their learnability. However, the main difference between both 
experiments is in their expressivity: in experiment one, the languages that emerge have a high 
degree of ambiguity between the signal-meaning pairs, whilst experiment two manages to bypass 
this through the introduction of a filter (ibid). In a later paper (Cornish, Tamariz & Kirby, in press), 
these results are further analysed under a new experimental methodology (see § ... for an in-depth 
discussion), which investigates this perceived tension between learnability and expressivity. The 
major finding of this paper is the ability to discover the types of structure that emerged in two of 
their languages. First, they find one of the languages from the first experiment is clearly the result of 
underspecification: “*...+ a reduction in the total number of distinct signals, introducing ambiguity 
with respect to the meanings” (Cornish, Tamariz & Kirby, pg. 4). Still, this ambiguity is not a random 
assignment of signals and meanings, but rather a system of consistently structured mappings 
emerged. 
A language from the second experiment, however, is not the result of underspecification. Rather, it 
appears to be more expressive and communicatively functional, which on the basis of Cornish, 
Tamariz & Kirby’s results suggests it is compositional: “whereby the meaning of a given string could 
be inferred by the meaning of sub-parts of that string (morphemes) and the way they are put 
together.” (ibid, pg. 4). To test this notion, they used an analysis program called RegMap, a metric 
that measures the systematicity of a language (see results section for a comprehensive overview). 
These results not only tend to confirm the notion recently considered by Christiansen & Chater 
(2008), whereby language adapts to the user to become learnable – it also has to adapt to brain 
external constraints found in the transmission itself (Smith, Kirby & Smith, 2008). Therefore, there 
are essentially two known pressures acting upon language: greater learnability versus expressivity – 
and it is these competing pressures that allow for structure to emerge over a certain length of time 
(ibid).  
3.4. Discussion 
In following on from chapter two, this chapter lays out  that the iterated learning paradigm provides 
a good methodological framework to study the cultural transmission of language (Kirby & Hurford, 
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2002), investigate the role of biases (Griffiths & Kalish, 2005), and to consider the dynamics of 
populations (Vogt, 2005b; Ferdinand & Zuidema, 2009). Furthermore, through the amalgamation of 
diffusion chains (Barlett, 1932), artificial language learning (Christiansen, 2000) and other 
communication experiments (Selten & Warglien, 2007), we can see how iterated learning can be 
applied in a laboratory setting (Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008).  
It is clear from the literature that cultural transmission does influence language given the right 
settings. The primary setting, or pre-condition, according to Hurford & Kirby (2002) is the 
transmission bottleneck: that the transmission mediates, and subsequently shapes, language. 
Replicating the results of monadic chains in the laboratory has also proved successful in showing 
that random artificial languages become increasingly structured, more learnable and, in some cases, 
compositional.  
Yet there are also instances where ILM do not use bottlenecks (Batali, 1998; Vogt, 2005; Swarup & 
Gasser, 2009), and instead rely on other dynamics to obtain similar results. These studies pose 
significant challenges to the influence of the transmission bottleneck. They also enable us to delve 
deeper into the conclusions drawn from human iterated learning, namely: are they constructing 
compositionality in their experiments? In contrast to the statement put forward by Kirby, Cornish & 
Smith of their experiment validating “that cultural transmission can lead to the appearance of design 
without a designer” (pg. 10681), an alternative is they simply designed the system towards 
converging on compositionality. By adding an artificial bottleneck and then adding a filter, the 
authors are arguably tweaking the system in the manner of an omnipotent designer. Of course, the 
theoretical literature somewhat substantiates the inclusion of both an artificial bottleneck (Deacon, 
1997) and a filter (reference), in that these processes are analogues of “a pressure to be expressive 
that would come from communicative need in the case of real language transmission” (Kirby, 
Cornish & Smith, 2008, pg. 10684). 
Still, there is always the possibility of elements within the linguistic environment playing a greater 
role than the transmission. As already touched upon, these factors may be something like a 
systematicity bias (Tamariz & Smith, 2008; Brown, 2008). Bayesian population models also 
demonstrate that other factors – primarily population size and variability in the input (Dediu, 2009; 
Smith, 2009; Ferdinand & Zuidema, 2009) – influence the relative roles of biases and the subsequent 
formation of structured languages. All these factors suggest further investigation is warranted into 
cultural transmission, with us specifically asking: what will happen in the laboratory setting if we 
introduce a larger population size and variability in the input? It is with this question in which we 
turn to the next chapter.    
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Chapter Four 
Introducing population dynamics into human iterated learning 
4.1. Introducing variability in the input 
The desirable conditions when investigating the cultural transmission of language would mirror the 
complex dynamics of some Bayesian ILMs (Dediu, 2009; Ferdinand & Zuidema, 2009). However, for 
all of the advantages introduced by working with real people, there is also a manifesto of pitfalls in 
the comparatively limited resources. To this end, the experiment outlined below will be aimed at 
introducing variability into human iterated learning through increasing the population size. The 
central hypothesis in this dissertation is that combining the inputs of several participants will 
produce a significant impact on the evolution an artificial language over iterated learning.  
Given the findings of Kirby et al. (2008), it only seems natural that the framework they have 
developed should be extended to consider different facets of cultural and linguistic phenomena. The 
initial successes of empirical experimentation through human iterated learning allow us to address 
the viability of the approach when exposed to two different experimental conditions: monadic 
chains and polyadic chains15. By performing an experiment, this dissertation will hopefully be 
investigating new territory whilst being able to analyse the results generated in the context of 
existing literature. Specifically, I hypothesise the diversity introduced in the input will lead to two 
findings: 
1. The final languages will be significantly more structured and learnable than the initial 
languages. 
2. That the final output of both participants in the polyadic condition will be composed of 
more similar languages than both participants in the monadic condition. 
4.1. Methodology 
This section outlines the methodological framework utilised for the experiments in §4.2. 
4.1.1. Overview 
The experiment adopts a similar methodological approach to that found in Kirby, Cornish & Smith 
(2008), albeit with modifications to introduce diversity in the input (see §4.1.2 onwards). As such, 
each experiment consisted of ten generations of learners with each subject being exposed (via a 
computer) to an artificial alien language, which is a combination of pictures (the meanings) paired 
                                                             
15 From here on in, I will be using this terminology to describe the single-chain (monadic) and dual-chain (polyadic) 
experiments.  
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alongside a string of letters (the signal). After the initial training, the subject moved on to the testing 
phase where they were presented with the pictures but not the strings. The goal for each subject 
was to provide the correct response (a string of letters) when presented with the pictures. These 
responses then became the subsequent input for the next generation. Importantly, participants 
were not told about the overall aim of the experiment, and were only given verbal and written 
instructions as to the nature of the task. Participants were instructed to always give response, even 
in instances when they did not know the response. 
As in Kirby, Cornish & Smith (2008), beyond the verbal and written instructions given at the start, no 
explicit feedback was given to the subjects whilst performing the task. Therefore, each person in the 
next generation is receiving input solely on the observations, and subsequent productions, made in 
the previous generation.   
4.1.2. Structure of chains 
As noted, there were subtle modifications made to Kirby, Cornish & Smith’s (2008) methodology to 
introduce diversity in the input. The first of these modifications was the use of two different 
experimental conditions across four transmission chains: a monadic condition and a polyadic 
condition. In the two monadic chains, initial participants were given the same randomly generated 
alien language. Their output was then used to train subsequent participants in the chain (figure 2) – 
each generation repeating the process of using the input from the previous generation to train on, 
and then producing the output for the next generation, and so on. The second experimental 
condition followed a similar outline, with the initial polyadic generations having received the same 
randomly generated alien language as the monadic condition. In contrast to the monadic condition, 
both participants in a single generation of the polyadic condition were exposed to two inputs. In the 
case of the first generation, this was just two versions of the same generation artificial language, 
with subsequent generations being exposed to both outputs of the previous generation (figure 3).   
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4.1.3. Meaning space and initial alien language 
Structure of meaning space 
The structure of the meaning space is similar to that used in Kirby, Cornish & Smith (2008), with 
pictures consisting of three dimensions: motion, colour and shape (table num). However, there is a 
slight difference: the meaning space was reduced from 27 to 18 meanings. This was done on the 
basis of a pilot study, in which 54 meaning-signal pairs for the polyadic condition16 was simply too 
much for participants to handle – and suggested it would take longer for any sort of structure to 
emerged, which, due to budgetary limitations, is not an aspect I could take liberties. As this 
experiment needed to compare both monadic and polyadic conditions, it was decided that both 
meanings spaces would be reduced to 18 distinct meanings: 18 meaning-signal pairs for monadic 
condition and 36 meaning-signal pairs for the polyadic condition. A shape was chosen to be removed 
on the basis of it being the least salient dimension in previous studies (see Cornish, Tamariz & Kirby, 
in press). 











Table 2: Table showing the meaning space structure used in both conditions, with an example on either side. 
 
                                                             
16 Remember, the polyadic condition consisted of two inputs, so a meaning space of 27 doubles to 54.  
 
 
Figure 1: Standard Human Iterated Learning 
using vertical transmission dynamic 
 
 
Figure 2: Human Iterated Learning with 
variability introduced in the input.  
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Structure of initial alien language 
Unlike the languages in computational ILMs (Kirby & Hurford, 2002), the initial language used in this 
experiment was not the result of agents inventing a random language – as asking participants to do 
the same thing could result in any number of issues. Instead, the structure of the initial alien 
language was produced by a largely similar method to Kirby, Cornish & Smith: a generator was used, 
which randomly concatenated nine syllables into strings that were three syllables long. These three-
syllable strings were then arbitrarily assigned with the 18 meanings. As such, there should be no 
significant relationship between the signal and meaning elements. The rationale for using only three-
syllable instead of two to four syllable strings was for purposes of analysis (for details, see §4.4.). 
The major reason for the language being composed of random one-to-one mappings between 
signals and meanings is that the end result is a language devoid of any noticeable structure at both 
whole word and syllabic levels. Any structure that does emerge in successive generations then, is the 
result of some other aspect – and not because of some initial structure that was emphasised at 
every successive generation.  
4.1.4. Participants 
A total of 40 participants (23 female, 17 male, mean age = 23, s.d. = 3) were recruited; 20 made up 
the two monadic chains, and 20 made up the polyadic chains. Criteria for exclusion from study, 
included: 1) if participants had studied linguistics at university level; 2) they suffered from dyslexia; 
and, 3) they were not native English speakers. All participants were given an informed consent sheet 
to sign, and following the alien language task were given a questionnaire to answer (see Appendix I), 
which on completion resulted in them earning £5 for their participation. One aspect of the 
questionnaire was a scale of difficulty from one to five: one being easy, and five being very difficult. 
Across both polyadic and monadic conditions, participants found the task consistently hard – 
regardless of the specific generation. The mean rating in each condition being 4 (monadic) and 4.46 
(polyadic).     
4.1.5. Procedure 
Using a modified version of the program used in Kirby, Cornish & Smith (2008), the experiment was 
run on a computer under laboratory conditions. As already mentioned there are two conditions in 
this study, which are based on the input provided to the next generation in the chain: 
 In the monadic condition, subjects were trained on 18, randomly assigned meaning-signal 
pairs across two rounds of training. Interspersed between the first and second round of 
training was a test phase where the participants receive 9 meanings without the 
corresponding signals. At this point, the participants enter their responses. 
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 In the polyadic condition the set up was largely similar, except this time participants were 
trained on a total 36 meaning-signal pairs. However, when it came to the test phase, 
participants were only tested a total of 18 meanings. So, the responses of two separate 
participants (two rounds of 9 each) make up the entire meaning-signal space of the next 
generation. 
Unlike Kirby, Cornish & Smith (2008) there is no artificial bottleneck or filter in this experiment17. 
Given I am investigating the role of populations, by removing the artificial bottleneck and filter this 
experiment can be contrasted with that of other experiments into human iterated learning.     
The amount of exposure to the stimuli was determined by the program, with the participants having 
an unlimited amount of time to provide an answer during the testing phase. In between each 
participant, the meaning-signal pairs were rearranged as to avoid introducing any odd bias by having 
the exact same ordering of meaning-signal pairs for every generation. Below is the exact schedule 
that participants followed in both experimental conditions: 
 Training on 9 (monadic) or 18 (polyadic) meaning-signal pairs; 
 Tested on 9 meanings; 
 Break; 
 Training on the additional 9 (monadic) or 18 (polyadic) meaning-signal pairs; 
 Tested on 9 meanings; 
 End. 
 
4.3. Learnability & Structure  
This section will now outline the results of the experiment.  
4.3.1. A decreasing transmission error 
When examining the concept of learnability in the context of transmission chains, a useful heuristic 
is to consider the transmission error by calculating the mean distance between all the signals in a 
participant’s output and the corresponding signals in the previous generation’s output (Kirby, 
Cornish & Smith, 2008). This gives a measure of the transmission error across all generations, and 
can be formulised as: 
                                                             
17 Of course, participants bring their own natural bottlenecks to the task of learning, such as perceptual, memory, 
processing and other cognitive constraints.   
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As reported in Kirby, Cornish & Smith, “where s i 
m is the string associated with meaning m by the 
participant at generation i, LD s i 
m, s j 
m is the normalized Levenshtein distance [...] between strings s 
i 
m and s j 
m, and the sum is over a set of meanings M of magnitude ∣M∣.” (2008, pg. 10686). 
Essentially, a decreasing transmission error reflects an increasing amount of inter-generational 
learnability – as demonstrated in the case of this experiment (see fig.4). To further support the 
contention of the languages becoming increasingly learnable, a paired t-test shows there is a 
significant decrease in error between the initial and final generations of the chain (mean decrease 
0.561, SD = 0.317; t(2) = 7.2525; P = 0.0185). 
 
Figure 4. The transmission error of both monadic and polyadic conditions across 10 generations. The monadic condition 
consists of two chains (monadic A & monadic B) plotted on the graph, whilst the polyadic plot is an average of score taken 
from four chain combinations (polyadic A chain, polyadic B chain, polyadic AB chain and polyadic BA chain, see appendix 
IV). The rationale for plotting the average score instead of two separate chains is because the polyadic condition should be 
seen as essentially a single chain made up of multiple individuals.  
As suggested by Kirby, Cornish & Smith (2008), this increase in learnability is an example of the 
languages adapting to become increasingly transmissible. Despite this, a more pertinent question for 
this dissertation concerns any perceivable differences between the polyadic and monadic chains: 
namely, does introducing variability in the input decrease the learnability of a language? To 
investigate, an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) shows that there is no significant difference between 
the polyadic and monadic groups, as indicated by a one-way ANOVA (d.f.=2; F=1.464; p = 0.24). 
4.3.2. An increasing structure 
Yet how do we explain this increase in learnability? In contrast to Kirby et al (ibid), the absence of 
both a filter and an artificial bottleneck means this experiment is not initially equipped to rule out 
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the possibility of participants using a different heuristic strategy to generalisation (such as rote 
learning) when learning the language. That the participants fail to reproduce the chain faithfully 
from generation-to-generation is partially indicative of them not wholly relying on rote learning; 
rather, in later generations at least, the participants appear to rely on a more systematic method – 
they impose a structural relationship between the signals and meanings. 
Quantifying the emergence of an increasingly structured language is computed using a pairwise 
distance correlation (PDC). PDC uses a normalized Levenshtein distance, which calculates the edit 
distance between all pairs of strings in the language, and then the Hamming distance for the 
distances between all pairs of meanings. Next, Pearson’s product-moment correlation is applied to 
these two sets of distances, giving an indication as to which “similar meanings are expressed using 
similar strings” (ibid, pg. 10686). Lastly, a Monte Carlo sample of 1,000 randomizations is used to 
give the z score for the veridical correlation (ibid).  As fig.5 shows, the languages are gradually 
evolving to become increasingly structured, with the output of the final generation being 
significantly more structured than the initial language (mean increase 4.970, SD = 2.046; t(2) = 
10.1552, P = 0.0096). 
 
Figure 5.  Measure of structure in both monadic and polyadic conditions across 10 generations. The monadic condition 
consists of two chains (monadic A & monadic B) plotted on the graph. As with the transmission error, the polyadic plot is an 
average of score taken from four chain combinations (see appendix IV). The dotted line on the graph gives the 95% 
confidence interval so that any result above this line is indicative of being a non-random combination of meanings and 
signals.  
4.3.2. Similarity of languages 
Now that we know the structure is increasing across all three groups, the next question to consider 
is the similarity of strings within the polyadic and monadic conditions. Given the introduction of 
variability in the input, the expected result is that the two polyadic chains are more similar in their 
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output at the final generation than the two monadic chains. To calculate this, the edit distances of 
corresponding strings in each condition were calculated. For instance, at generation 10 in the 
monadic condition, there are two strings (wannapo and wakini) corresponding to a specific meaning 
( ). By calculating the normalised edit distance of these two strings, the LD equals 0.77. Likewise, 
the same method is applied to the two corresponding strings (kimini and kiwani) in the polyadic 
condition (LD = 0.33). To act as a benchmark against which we can compare both polyadic and 
monadic conditions, the edit distances of two random languages were calculated and plotted on a 




Figure 6. Similarity measurement of the two polyadic chains, the two monadic chains and two random languages. Error 
bars on random language plot show the confidence interval of the random language, with a decreasing LD being indicative 
of increasingly similarity. As you can see, the strings between both monadic chains are no more similar than the randomly 
generated language. Meanwhile, the strings between the polyadic chains are more similar in their output at almost every 
generation (the exception being generation 1). 
With the exception of generation 1 the polyadic chains appear to be more similar in their output to 
that of the monadic chains – which are no more similar than two randomly generated languages. 
4.3.4. Summary 
The main findings of this section confirm the first of my hypotheses: that both the monadic and 
polyadic chains are significantly more structured and learnable than the initial language. That these 
two conditions appear to behave similarly in their development, despite the introduction of 
variability in the input, is striking. The languages are appearing to adapt to their conditions in almost 
identical manners, yet there are also noticeable differences. In particular, the confirmation of my 
second hypothesis – concerning the similarity of output in both conditions – suggests there is a 
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fundamental discrepancy between the two conditions: the two monadic chains drift apart fairly early 
on in the chain, and remain no more similar than two random languages, whilst the polyadic chains 
evolve as a single system, with the output of both individuals from generation 2 onwards being 
much more similar than pure chance.  
Another striking feature of this study is the parallels we can draw with other human iterated learning 
experiments. In contrast to Kirby, Cornish & Smith (2008) this study does not use an artificial 
bottleneck or filter, yet it achieves comparable results to their first experiment. Naturally, the 
emergence of structure in a language, despite the absence of these conditions, does not negate their 
theoretical appeal, largely because the emergence of structure in this experiment does not imply it is 
compositional. So, the obvious question to ask is as follows: what type of structure has evolved in 
these languages? 
4.4. Expressivity of alien language 
4.4.1. The signal-meaning space 
Having established that both monadic and polyadic chains are becoming easier to learn and 
increasingly structured, this section will now investigate what type of structure emerged by probing 
the expressivity of the languages. 
As Kirby, Cornish & Smith (2008) highlight, two ways18 in which a language can converge on a 
systematic and predictable structure is through either underspecification or compositionality. First, 
to gain a greater understanding of the signal-meaning correspondence, we can examine the final 
generation of each chain and see if there are any obvious patterns. Interestingly, in both conditions 
the system that emerges appears to be structured around one of the meaning dimensions – motion 





                                                             
18 Obviously this is not exclusively restricted to underspecification and compositionality. For instance, a form of linguistic 
categorisation could emerge as an alternative structure. 










Monadic B wakini, wakinini, mahini miuni, muini, gopoka gopogo, gopoka 
Polyadic A kimini, kiminni, kiwini, 
kimiminni 
gu, go19 guro, gurao, guarmo, 
guarno 
Polyadic B kiwani, kiwimmi, kimimni, 
kimmimi 
gu, go guarno, guaro, maro 
Table 2.  The correspondence between signals and the motion meaning space at generation 10 in the monadic and 
polyadic conditions.  
At first glance there does appear to be some sort of consistent structure pertaining to motion, but it 
is not clear whether this is compositional or not. For instance, in monadic chain A the language 
shows a consistent structure from generation 6 onwards, but at generation 10 there is not any 
noticeable compositionality: the sub-parts of a string do not show any specific relationship with a 
particular motion. Looking across the final generations, specifically when the language is at its most 
structured (generation 8), and what is immediately noticeable are the hallmarks of systematic 
structure: the initial segment appears to encode for motion (example 1). 
Example 1 Colour Shape Motion 
wan  Blue (2), black(2), red(2) Circle(3), triangle(3) Bounce (6) 
wa Blue(2), red(2), black(2) Circle(3), triangle(3) Straight (6) 
gu Blue(2), red(2), black (2) Circle(3), triangle(3) Spiral (6) 
Example 1.  Table looking at the initial segmentation in generation 8 of monadic chain A. 
This systematic structure can only be explained by looking at a specific sub-part of a string (the initial 
segment)20, and not the whole words. However, neither colour nor shape appears to strongly 
correspond with any other sub-part, which means only partial compositionality is being achieved.  
Furthermore, this structure breaks down at generation 10, with the participant not distinguishing 
between wan and wa as in previous generations. As a result, it is dubious as to whether or not this 
particular compositional structure would have continued if new generations were added to the 
chain – the segmentation does not contain enough distinction (wan and wa are more closely related 
than gu). 
                                                             
19 Of particular note is the choice of the string ‘go’ to describe a representation of forward motion: its length and common 
occurrence as an English verb may make it highly salient to participants. Hence its consistent prevalence, alongside the 
closely related ‘gu’, in successive generations.     
20 It is interesting to note that the segmentation of wan and wa was not an arbitrary segmentation in order to give the 
appearance of systematicity. For instance, a word would be segmented wan if it was followed by an additional n, as in 
wannapo and wannawe. So, words such as wanapo and wanawe were segmented with into wa, allowing for the second 
segment in both instances to be na. However, this is an orthographic influence as opposed to phonetic, and probably 
explains why this particular feature does not remain stable.  
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Still, as previously mentioned, participants could just be rote learning, rather than inferring structure 
through generalisation. For instance, from generation 9 to generation 10 (monadic B) there is an 
almost perfect replication of the entire language21, which is indicative of the language being highly 
learnable. Yet this perfect replication also includes gopoka corresponding with a straight motion – in 
contrast to the general trend of gopoka encoding a spiral motion. Given this discrepancy is 
replicated at generations 8, 9 & 10, then it is almost certain that, for this particular signal at least, 
participants are rote learning the correspondence.    
The polyadic condition also shows a similar adaptation to the meaning space; in that the language 
appears to have converged upon a systematic method for encoding motion. However, a clear 
difference between the polyadic and monadic chains are the rules that emerged to reach this 
adaptive solution. The system is generally noisier and vaguer than either of the monadic chains at 
generation 10, with gu, for instance, encoding both a straight and spiral motion. As participants 
relayed in their questionnaire responses, the method of distinguishing between these two gu(s), and 
the motion it is encoding for, is through length. So, when participants see a spiral motion, then they 
know the word is going to begin with gu followed by additional syllables: e.g. gu-ar-mo. If, on the 
other hand, the motion is straight, then the word is either gu or go – without any additional 
syllables. 
4.4.2. The evolution of signals 
The second step in examining expressivity is to show how each of the languages developed their 
structure by devising a coalescent tree (see fig.4, 5 and 6). Commonly used in evolutionary biology 
(Barton, 2007), and more recently in linguistics (Cornish, Tamariz & Kirby, in press), coalescent trees 
represent descent across generations.  
As all three trees show (fig.), the general trend is that the frequency of distinct strings (numbers in 
brackets) decreases, whilst the transmission fidelity increases – more strings are perfectly replicated 
at later generations (as indicated by thick black lines). This is evident in the disparity between the 
initial and final generations, where in the former, there are very few instances of whole strings being 
stably reproduced; instead, it is the sub-components of a string that are transmitted and 
recombined with other sub-components. For instance, the appearance of the form mahini at 
generation 7 (monadic chain B) may be the consequence of a blending between manini and wahini.  
In fact, coalescent trees allow us to trace the genealogy of a language to observe changes “that are 
well attested in cases of natural language change” (Cornish, Tamariz & Kirby, in press, pg. 7). Looking 
                                                             
21 The exception being miuni undergoing metathesis into muini. 
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across all three chains, and there are instances of single segment replacements (gupoki  into gopoki), 
reductions (gowaki into waki), metathesis (miuni into muini), and as already mentioned, blends 
(wikinini & wahini into  wakini & wakinini). 
  





Figure 7. Coalescent trees showing signal lineages for all 18 items over generations of monadic A (top) and monadic B 
(bottom). Notice that the tree is for whole signals instead of sub-segments, given that both languages produced in these 
conditions are not decomposable. Columns correspond to generations; thin lines show possible relationships between signal 
elements; and, thick lines indicate a perfect replication of the whole signal. Numbers shown in brackets correspond to 
frequency information (the number of times that signal was produced at a specific generation). 
When examining the monadic chains more closely, the obvious observation is the gradual reduction 
in the number of distinct signals, and an increase in the frequency of words more closely related 
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through descent. These two observations are not arbitrarily connected, but rather, when combined, 
it becomes clear why learnability increases: the reduction in the number of distinct words results in 
less diversity, which in turn narrows the statistical likelihood of de novo strings arising. Subsequently, 
the system becomes more stable and, as the reduction is systematic in the monadic chains, the final 
generations exhibit a clear and learnable structure. 
 
 
Figure 8. Coalescent trees showing signal lineages for all 36 items over generations of polyadic condition. Notice that the 
tree is for whole signals instead of sub-segments, given that both languages produced in these conditions are not 
decomposable. Columns correspond to generations; thin lines show possible relationships between signal elements; and, 
thick lines indicate a perfect replication of the whole signal. Numbers shown in brackets correspond to frequency 
information (the number of times that signal was produced at a specific generation). Notice how the number distinct strings 
decreases across generations, with both chains converging upon increasingly similar strings/signals.  
 As in the monadic chains, the polyadic coalescent tree is an example of a non-compositional system 
– there is no apparent parsimonious segmentation that consistently corresponds to each of the 
meaning dimensions. Conversely, the polyadic condition initially increases the number of distinct 
signals, and only after this initial increase does it begin to decrease – but only to levels not much 
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different to generation 0 (see table). But why do the participants at the first generation end up 
producing 31 distinct meanings after being exposed to just 18, whilst generation 8 manage to slightly 
decrease their number to 16? 
Generation 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Polyadic Chains 18 31 26 23 27 22 22 18 16 15 16 
Table 3.  Number of distinct signals at each generation in the polyadic condition. Notice that at both generation 0 and 
generation 7 there are 18 distinct signals, which almost doubles in the first generation but decreases in the eighth 
generation. In both instances the total number of distinct signals at each generation are the product of two individuals.  
As you can see, both groups of participants were exposed to 18 distinct signals, yet for some reason 
the later generations are able to decrease the number. In fact, at their sub-component level, the 18 
signals at generation 0 display less variation in their number of syllables (10), than those at 
generation 7 (21). Instead, the reason for this disparity, as suggested by the coalescent tree, is due 
to the ordering of the sub-components into a more consistent structure. For instance, the number of 
distinct signal elements beginning with gu at the generation 0 (3) is far less than at generation 7 (7). 
What this suggests is that the sub-components are ordering themselves in a systematic manner, 
with certain signal aspects aligning themselves with a particular motion. A brilliant example is the 
word maro. Originally introduced at generation 4, maro was perfectly transmitted right through to 
generation 10, yet the actual frequency of the word remained around 1 per generation. However, 
the specific sub-component, ar, was far more influential and salient in its spread – going from a 
single appearance at generation 4 to eleven times in generation 10. Therefore, the alignment of ar 
always corresponds to a spiral motion by generation 10, which means the word maro will also 
always correspond to this particular motion. 
4.4.3. Investigating regularity of mappings in alien languages 
As previously mentioned, distinguishing between underspecification and compositionality is difficult 
to infer from PDC – all we know is that a correlation exists between the meaning structure and signal 
spaces. To quantify whether or not compositionality has emerged in the languages, a program 
named RegMap (short for regularity of the mapping) is used, which measures the confidence that a 
particular signal element encodes a specific meaning element is needed (Tamariz & Smith, 2008). 
Specifically, RegMap is “an information-theoretical metric that combines the conditional entropy of 
meanings given signals and of signals given meanings and normalizes the result to make it 
comparable across systems of different sizes” (Cornish, Tamariz & Kirby, in press, pg. 8). For any 
given meaning element (M) and signal segment (S), the RegMap is defined by the equation below:   
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Very simply, H(X|Y) –  the conditional entropy, which in itself is a method of quantifying the 
remaining uncertainty of a variable (Y) on the assumption that the value of variable X is a known – is 
the Shannon entropy (Shannon, 1948), except p(x) is replaced with p(x|y) (Cornish, Tamariz & Kirby, 
in press). H(S|M) applies to comprehension, in that it is the conditional entropy of the signal 
segment given the meaning feature; the level of uncertainty about a particular meaning when the 
segment is a known quantity. Conversely, H(M|S) is the uncertainty about the signal when the 
meaning is known – and this relates to production (ibid). As such, “The logs of m and s normalise the 
values between 0 and 1; m is the number of different meaning values (e.g. triangle, circle, square for 
shape); s is the number of different segment variants in the relevant segment position.” (ibid, pg. 8). 
By subtracting the remaining entropies from 1, we can ascertain the level of confidence as opposed 
to uncertainty (ibid). 
Below are the RegMap values for the initial, middle and final signal and meaning elements of both 
polyadic and monadic conditions across 10 generations (figures n). The data fed into RegMap 
consists of strings broken down into three syllables (for instance, ki-wa-ni); the rationale being that 
in Cornish, Tamariz & Kirby their compositional language adapted to the meaning space at the level 
of the signal elements: for instance, if ki-wa-ni was compositional, each syllable may correspond to a 
different meaning (shape (ki), colour (wa) and motion (ni)). These segmented values are then paired 
with a meaning space, which consists of numbers corresponding to a specific meaning (e.g. 1=blue, 
4=wavy, 7=circle etc). Lastly, to determine the significance of the RegMap values, a Monte-Carlo 
analysis was employed, consisting of 1,000 randomisations of the correspondences between 
meanings and signals (see table 4). 
  




Table 4. The z-scores for the RegMap of both monadic and polyadic conditions. Numbers highlighted in blue indicate a p-
value significance below 0.5. Numbers highlighted in yellow indicate a p-value significance below 0.05. Notice that in all 
four chains, motion is consistently encoded as indicated by the highly significant z-scores.    
 
  
Colour Colour Colour Motion Motion Motion Shape Shape Shape RegMap
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 (Language)
1 0.16783 -0.63157 -1.13663 -0.92256 1.005328 2.457363 -0.81884 0.388446 -0.17524 0.951754546
2 0.002086 -0.98509 -0.43214 0.631733 1.521454 3.078197 -1.46961 -0.55764 0.879176 -1.472333156
3 0.20167 1.401317 -1.02941 2.614116 1.837374 0.692362 -1.30356 -0.8652 0.543292 -0.313780699
4 -0.19397 -0.70535 -1.51629 1.811142 0.044413 0.881275 -1.26134 -1.24567 -1.49942 0.853642636
Monadic A 5 -0.31378 1.287951 -0.54215 2.526472 -0.70661 1.444837 1.229012 -0.56337 1.20479 -0.306894568
6 -1.11029 -0.63054 -1.51902 6.759614 4.487519 4.664548 1.297254 1.966002 1.811256 -1.323276566
7 -0.60833 0.703662 -0.53284 8.020848 5.679249 1.53482 -0.79834 -0.84216 0.612932 0.639565908
8 -1.55404 -0.31816 0.408768 8.09361 2.577962 1.439741 -0.17217 0.940028 0.189961 0.468
9 -0.08451 -1.09282 -1.12547 3.717863 5.966809 5.37316 -1.12167 -1.06841 1.386944 -1.710912007
10 -1.01473 -0.65398 -0.13793 4.324063 4.011833 2.860041 -0.84459 -1.13771 -0.86232 -0.750909224
Colour Colour Colour Motion Motion Motion Shape Shape Shape RegMap
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 (Language)
1 0.147305 1.453449 1.821834 -0.34709 -0.74563 -0.42841 1.159593 -0.96643 -0.12124 -0.519256947
2 0.660157 -0.81004 -1.44606 1.192103 4.32988 3.007764 -0.29756 0.575842 0.323457 -0.034617171
3 -2.19151 -1.92616 -1.01138 3.12406 4.941006 4.475433 0.145873 1.920221 0.848782 -0.421405513
4 -0.14026 -0.41776 -0.097 2.686932 3.578177 2.192115 -1.88396 0.385138 -0.38017 -0.411785243
Monadic B 5 -1.28158 -1.15892 -1.16758 -0.01419 -0.18903 0.500972 -1.29101 1.898251 1.088019 -1.505765838
6 -0.87779 -0.6995 -0.23086 2.138777 2.513265 0.06739 -0.65242 0.800968 -1.37973 1.459321548
7 1.974917 2.529767 0.125391 1.958502 2.186402 1.9734 0.57687 -0.02493 0.48807 -0.926541418
8 -0.81147 0.427063 -0.50055 6.380394 6.185541 5.185014 -0.94821 -1.00628 3.050559 -3.010675803
9 -1.26464 -0.01576 -0.51228 6.440252 6.276903 5.181803 -1.50284 -0.76968 3.303901 -3.19860506
10 -0.93884 0.214729 -0.56062 5.832373 5.416575 5.695034 -1.61531 -1.12624 3.244446 -3.092811019
Colour Colour Colour Motion Motion Motion Shape Shape Shape RegMap
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 (Language)
1 0.30064 0.638393 1.283215 0.298916 1.28958 0.456507 0.300436 1.774207 0.65799 -0.458749672
2 -0.9599 -1.57337 -1.12777 -0.95617 5.997138 5.575769 8.825716 0.98147 0.52816 3.381180727
3 -1.62394 -0.59464 1.141956 -0.35484 -0.07166 2.688043 5.564119 1.015778 0.021357 3.460833867
4 0.508684 -0.54267 -0.71989 1.530338 3.902569 2.348022 -0.0152 0.538818 1.538305 -1.418426946
Polyadic A 5 1.02254 -0.78878 -1.53526 0.512062 5.243631 2.883852 0.479927 1.445987 0.165867 1.327823269
6 -0.56281 -1.36771 -1.41482 0.422787 5.625355 4.347909 0.246366 1.629446 -0.1473 1.561269134
7 1.441907 -0.24771 -1.5262 -0.12908 4.288788 5.760052 1.260371 2.336477 1.739814 1.36564606
8 -1.605 -0.95836 -1.22815 4.316907 6.971016 5.600324 1.046342 0.567773 -0.03227 -0.34735033
9 -0.0143 -1.77705 -0.05349 6.379837 6.749911 7.13928 -0.79163 1.893217 0.973211 -1.864002602
10 -1.02708 -0.64785 -0.93843 7.021849 6.382948 6.777793 -0.64983 0.942612 1.45724 -1.974483955
Colour Colour Colour Motion Motion Motion Shape Shape Shape RegMap
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 (Language)
1 -1.20456 1.153753 0.032636 -0.53451 0.252205 -1.71941 4.033044 -0.67661 -1.02526 2.237751531
2 -1.59137 -0.26354 -1.05546 -1.63129 -0.25288 -0.78546 4.159555 -0.5857 -0.82402 4.266608479
3 -0.73804 -1.25102 0.21914 -0.74925 4.519162 3.231535 6.61201 2.069303 0.669051 2.20652583
4 -1.02911 0.071129 -1.56686 -0.12988 4.926678 3.127075 1.364375 0.853006 -0.09732 1.886061386
Polyadic B 5 -0.12992 -0.23199 -1.12343 2.202715 2.95062 2.767656 -1.02815 1.646803 -0.04532 -0.63907539
6 -0.89595 -1.41789 -0.45485 0.349207 4.901421 4.009297 1.934496 1.299138 1.161164 1.316315037
7 -0.5095 -1.33984 -0.12102 3.1763 5.643258 5.122513 -0.11594 1.256198 0.270452 -1.0509506
8 -1.61364 -2.057 -0.28353 6.353086 6.44223 5.023997 -0.65909 1.137868 -1.02094 -0.068667359
9 -1.86477 -1.52516 -0.05025 6.345999 7.68403 6.911194 1.038453 1.406572 1.202109 -0.083783584
10 -1.61153 -0.66401 0.074947 6.467852 7.942617 5.527973 0.849453 1.382659 0.822713 -1.189982114















   
 
Figure 9. Regularity of the associations between signal and meaning elements of monadic chains A and B, for the initial, 
middle and final segments. The continuous coloured lines represent RegMap values obtained with all nine segment-
meaning pairs across ten generations. Notice that in every instance, motion emerges as the meaning dimension with the 
highest RegMap score. This suggests both languages are consistently encoding for motion over colour and shape.   
In both the graphs and tables, the general trend of results supports the assertion made throughout 
this section: in the later generations, motion is being consistently encoded at the initial, middle and 
final segments (p<0.01). The rate at which motion becomes encoded varies across segmentation and 
chains, but ultimately all four chains converge upon the same solution. As previously discussed, in 
Monadic A at generations 6 though to 8 we can see the emergence of an almost perfect mapping 
between the initial segment and motion. However, at generation 9 the distinction is somewhat lost, 
even though it retains its significance, as indicated in the table: the z-score of the initial segment 
drops from 8.09 to 3.72, whilst the final segment goes from 1.44 (non-significant) to 5.37. 
Monadic B, on the other hand, is the only chain to record a consistently significant negative RegMap 
score for the entire language (see generations 8, 9 and 10). This is because the RegMap is far lower 
than most of non-significant results, which could be accounted for by chance. 
  























   
Figure n. Regularity of the associations between signal and meaning elements of polyadic chains A, B and a combination of 
the best RegMaps of both chains for the initial, middle and final segments. Polyadic chains A and B do not have continuous 
lines because the distinction between chains is arbitrary, with solitary plots representing the RegMap values obtained with 
all nine segment-meaning pairs; likewise for the continuous coloured lines in the polyadic combined graphs. As in the 
monadic condition, motion emerges as the meaning dimension with the highest RegMap score. This suggests the polyadic 
language is consistently encoding for motion over colour and shape.   
Lastly, the polyadic combined graph highlights another common theme of competition: both shape 
and motion are equally encoded in the initial segment at generation 8, but by generation 9 the 
conflict is resolved with motion being amplified to dominance.  
4.4.3.1. Discussion 
In short, the analyses of results outlined above demonstrate the languages in both monadic and 
polyadic conditions are not compositional. This is in contrast to one of the language families 
presented in Cornish, Tamariz & Kirby (in press), which converges on compositional system. As you 
can see in the RegMap graphs, most segmentations appear to encode for motion fairly early on in 
most of the chains. There are some instances where there is competition between meaning 
dimensions, as seen in the polyadic combined initial segment at generation 8. However, due to the 
rapid convergence towards stable system early on in all the chains, there is no evolutionary pressure 
for the languages to become compositional: they are already adequately adapted to their niche. This 
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somewhat validates the use of an artificial bottleneck and filter in other human iterated learning 
experiments, as participants in this experiment did not need to generalise as there is no unseen set.    
  




The central position taken by this study is that language is the result of adapting to various niches. It 
is a complex adaptive system (Beckner et al., 2009), and as such is potentially shaped by dizzying 
array of factors – one of which being cultural transmission (Smith & Kirby, 2008). Working on this 
basis, cultural transmission studies are able to investigate through theoretical (Deacon, 1997), 
experimental (Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008) and computational modelling (Kirby & Hurford, 2002) 
the origin, and subsequent emergence, of structure in language, arguing that the very fact “that 
language persists through multiple repeated patterns of usage can explain the origins of key 
structural properties that are universally present in language” (Cornish, Tamariz & Smith, in press, 
pg. 1). Using these theoretical underpinnings, this study has aimed to further investigate the role of 
population dynamics in human iterated learning. This section outlines the results of the study, 
whether or not it supports the hypotheses outlined at the start of this dissertation, how it fits in with 
the wider literature and lastly, ways in which the methodology can be improved upon for any 
potential future studies.  
5.1. Summary of results 
The results of experiments testing both monadic and polyadic conditions can be summarised as 
follows: 
1. In both conditions, the languages on average became more learnable and increasingly 
structured across the successive generations. This is demonstrated in the replication fidelity 
of the languages, with the transmission error between generations consistently decreasing, 
whilst the structure increased. 
2. That introducing variability in the input did not hinder or impinge upon the language 
becoming increasing learnability through the emergence of a systematic structure.   
3. As a result, this study has reproduced some of the findings in Kirby, Cornish & Smith (2008) 
without the need for an artificial bottleneck or filter. 
4. Furthermore, by measuring the edit distance between the output of both monadic chains, 
and then both polyadic chains, the second experimental hypothesis was confirmed: that the 
polyadic condition will have more similar languages in its final output than the output of 
participants in the monadic condition. 
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5. By using coalescent trees, this paper was able to show that in both conditions languages 
undergo processes commonly associated with natural language change, such as: single 
segment replacements, reductions, metathesis and blends. 
6. As in Cornish, Tamariz and Smith (in press), the results of this study are adapting to a three-
element meaning space. However, this is only at a holistic, and not compositional, level. 
7. Lastly, all four chains ended up encoding for a single meaning dimension: motion. 
The results outlined above offer interesting parallels and dissimilarities with previous studies. With 
this in mind, the forthcoming section will discuss these results in the context of the broader 
literature. Specifically, I will consider the notion of the resulting languages being a product of 
adaptation to the linguistic environment.  
5.2. Population dynamics and iterated learning 
5.2.1. Adapting to the linguistic environment 
The rationale for introducing variability in the input stems from explanatory power of population 
dynamics in biology (Hawks et al., 2007), culture (Mesoudi, Whiten & Laland, 2006), historical 
linguistics (Croft, 2006) and recent iterated learning models (Vogt, 2005b; Smith, 2009; Dediu, 2009; 
Ferdinand & Zuidema, 2009). Interestingly, whilst the particular population variable employed did 
not hinder the emergence of a systematic language, it also failed to exert any noticeable pressure22 
in actually shaping language development. This is because, in spite of not having an artificial 
bottleneck or filter, both monadic and polyadic conditions produce languages that are not only 
increasingly structured and more learnable, but that holistic strings appear to be adapting to encode 
motion. 
Nonetheless, the environment produced by experiment clearly creates pressures that are 
adequately explained by evolutionary mechanisms of variation, replication and selection when 
“applied to the mappings between signal and meaning elements” (Cornish, Tamariz & Kirby, in 
press). Through these respective processes, the linguistic environment forces unstructured mappings 
between signal and meaning elements to become systematically structured. However, unlike the 
aforementioned study, it appears the pressures on languages to become learnable are not inclined 
towards the emergence of compositionality. 
 
 
                                                             
22
 The obvious exception being how the signal elements in both polyadic chains became more similar over time, in contrast 
to the monadic condition: where the signal elements in the two monadic chains are no more similar than two randomly 
generated artificial languages. 
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Absence of a bottleneck means absence of compositionality? 
But what do these results in the context of transmission bottleneck? That the current experiments 
failed to produce compositional languages could stem from two possible conclusions. First, by 
imposing a transmission bottleneck and filter, Kirby, Cornish & Smith (2008) are more accurately 
mirroring the true dynamic a language learner brings to the task of acquisition: learners must 
generalise from a sparse, subset of linguistic data. Although this is technically true in accounting for 
the origins of compositional structure in the laboratory, there are equally compelling alternatives 
from computational modelling of peer-to-peer learning (Batali, 1998; Vogt, 2005b) and other 
complex population dynamics (Dediu, 2009). Answering the question of whether or not either one of 
these scenarios is an accurate reflection of the actual pre-linguistic conditions facing our hominid 
ancestors is currently still within the realm of speculation and conjecture. 
Encoding motion: adaptation to a perceptual niche? 
Another interesting question raised by this study is: how come the languages resulting from the 
polyadic and monadic conditions converged upon motion? 
 If it were just the polyadic condition, I might have argued the shared input resulted in participants 
converging upon the same solution. Although this might be part of the reason, it obviously fails to 
explain how the two monadic chains also end up encoding the same meaning dimension. Another 
alternative stems from the variance in the meaning dimension: given its 3x3x2 meaning-space 
structure, it is not surprising that the deficient meaning dimension (shape) is not consistently 
encoded. However, if this is the sole reason for the results, then why was colour not consistently 
encoded for, even though it shared the same number of meaning-spaces as motion? Instead, we can 
offer another consideration: languages are adapting to a perceptual constraint for motion, rather 
than colour and shape (Christiansen & Chater, in press). Partly corroborating this suggestion is a 
recent research paper outlines the role of the human parietal cortex in maintaining colour, shape 
and motion direction23 in visual short-term memory (Kawasaki et al., 2009). From their fMRI results, 
Kawasaki and colleagues’ most relevant finding for this study is that when all three features were 
presented to participants, only the anterior portion of the parietal cortex showed distinct activity for 
motion. Basically, this means that in contrast to the posterior parietal cortex which is memory-
dependent for all three features, the anterior section of the parietal cortex “plays a special role in 
the retention of motion direction information” (ibid, pg. 94).  
                                                             
23 Importantly, this study looked at motion-direction as an iconic representation, as is the case in this dissertation.   
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Of course, it is hard to infer too much from Kawasaki et al.’s findings in relation to this study. Yet if 
motion is held in visual short-term memory in a distinct manner, then this offers a potential 
explanation to the results of this study: languages are the products of very similar perceptual 
environments. Linking in with this notion is Chater & Christiansen’s discussion of studies into 
coordinated learning and rapid convergence (Feldman, 1997; Tenenbaum, 1999), which show “that 
people converge on the same categories incredibly rapidly, given a very small number of perceptual 
examples... Moreover, when people are allowed to interact, they rapidly align their choice of lexical 
items and frames of reference, even when dealing with novel and high ambiguous perceptual input” 
(2009, pg. 10). The level of interaction taking place is obviously limited in this study, given that the 
only aspect linking participants is that one will observe, and attempt to reproduce, the output of the 
previous participant. Nonetheless, the present observations certainly provide an impetus for further 
investigation. 
  




The current experimental results demonstrate that variability in the input does not hinder the 
emergence of a systematic and highly learnable language in human iterated learning. Furthermore, 
we have gained a glimpse at how languages exposed to different population dynamics can still 
converge on the same adaptive solution. That this structure emerged without the need for an 
artificial bottleneck or filter has important implications for future research, namely: do we need 
these conditions for the emergence of compositionality?  
As it stands, this experiment was unable to reproduce the results of Kirby, Cornish & Smith (2008) in 
seeing the development of a systematic and stable compositional language. However, we have only 
scratched the surface of investigating the role of population dynamics. There is certainly an opening 
for both horizontal and vertical transmission to be examined in iterated learning. Another potential 
road to traverse concerns the role of biases and how they impact upon explanatory framework of 
cultural transmission. Bayesian models are continuing to lead the way in examining the relative roles 
of the transmission, biases and population dynamics. Yet there is still a significant gap between 
translating the results in modelling into something we can understand and use to interpret 
laboratory results.  
At the start of this dissertation, I outlined the disparity between research into evolutionary biology 
and evolutionary linguistics. However, through a strong interdisciplinary framework across the 
theoretical, mathematical and experimental paradigms, recent decades have certainly seen the 
study of language evolution close in on its biological forbearer. Even though experiments into this 
expanding discipline are still in their infancy, it is with that infancy a degree of excitement emerges 
as to where the field will eventually take us.  





1.  How difficult would you rate the task of learning the alien language (on a scale of 1 – 5, with 1 




















6. If you couldn’t remember the exact picture to label correspondence during testing, did you try to 
use a pattern of some kind? 
 






0a 0b 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 5a 5b 
 
pogugu pogugu pogoni gu gonini gugoki gonini gonini kinni gokini gowanu kini 
 
nihuwa nihuwa pogogo gopogo gonine gugo gonini kinini kinine gokiki gokiki kiwini 
 
kokeke kokeke kikanu gupogu gonini gokani gokine gonine kigini kiwomi gokine kikimi 
 
kiwake kiwake kiwake kinine kinine kikeni kigoni kiwani kiwini kiwini guwanu kinine 
 
kimupo kimupo kiwani kiwapo kinini kikani kinini kiwani kiwani kikine wokini kuwinne 
 
hunini hunini waninu kinini kinini kigonu kinine kinine kinini kineni kiw kikinni 
 
wanipo wanipo kipogo gunipo gowanu gokine gu gonine go gu gu go 
 
munini munini nikaga guwani gowanu guniki gokine gogo kugano go go go 
 
kokiko kokiko kipogo gonini gowanu gu goranu goniki go keni go gu 
 
gupoki gupoki kigana kimuno kiwanu kigoni kinini kigo kimi ki gu gowapu 
 
gukopo gukopo wagiki kinena kipogo kiwaki kiwane kikini mini kiwani gu go 
 
muhuke muhuke wapogu kipogu kiwanu kikeki kiwanu kigo kini gu go kini 
 
kiwani kiwani kihuni gonagu gowanu gukeki gowapu gowane kugano guwanu maro gowanu 
 
kihumu kihumu kogupu gunopi goranu gopugu guwanu gowanu kiwapu gowani gomaro kugano 
 
nipohu nipohu kikanu gokimo gowanu gukeni gugopu gowanu gowapu gowanu kiwani gowapu 
 
wahuko wahuko waniki kikeke kiranu kigopu waneki kiwanu maro kewiki kenani maro 
 
wanihu wanihu kogupu gopini kiwanu waneki kinike kiwanu kuani guwanu kiwanu kiwemi 
 
gukogu gukogu kipogu wahene kiranu kiwane kirapu kiwane gowapu kiwanu gowanu gowapu 
 




6a 6b 7a 7b 8a 8b 9a 9b 10a 10b 
 
gokimi gukki gukki kiwini kiwimmi kiwimmo kiwini kiwimi kimini kiwani 
 
gokini gokiki gokiki kiwimi kiwimmi kiwini kiwimmi kiwimi kiminni kiwimmi 
 
gokinni kiwini gokiki gukimi kiwini kiwimmi kiwammi kimimmi kiwini kiwimmi 
 
gukinni kiwimmi gukki kiwini kiwini kimimmi kiwani kiwinni kiwini kiwani 
 
gokiki kuwimu gukinni kiwini kiwimmi kiwimmi kiwimi kimimmi kiminni kimimni 
 
gokiku guwemo kiwimmi kiwinni gurimi kiwammi kiwimi kitamo kimiminni kimmimi 
 
gu go go gu go go gu go gu go 
 
gu go go go go go go go gu go 
 
gu go go go go gu gu go gu go 
 
gu gu gu gu gu gu gu gu gu gu 
 
go gu gu gu gu gu gu gu gu gu 
 
go go go go gu go gu gu go gu 
 
gokimi maro guwaru guwamu gurapo guaru guaro guarno guro guarno 
 
gowapo gomaro gowaru gupano gurano guaro guaro guaro gurao guarno 
 
gowapu gepanu kimimmi guwamu gurapo kuwami maro guaro guarmo guaro 
 
kiwinni gespo kiwimmi kiwini gurano gutamo guramo guarno guarno guarno 
 
gukimi gupamu gokimi guwano gurami gutanu gurapo guaro guaro guaro 
 








0a 1a 2a 3a 4a 5a 6a 7a 8a 9a 10a 
 
pogugu nikawe wanaha nehipo wannapo wannapo wannawe wannawe wannapo wanipo wannapo 
 
nihuwa nihuwa guannapo guannapo wannapo wannawe nehipo wannapo wannapo wannapo wanipo 
 
kokeke wanahe wallapo wanhipi nehipo wannawe wannawe wannapo wannapo wanapo wannapo 
 
kiwake guwana nahapo wannawe wannawe wannapo wannawe wannapo wannapo wannapo wanipo 
 
kimupo guannpo guannpo guannapo gehipo nehipo wannawe wannawe wannawe wanipo winnipo 
 
hunini hihoho nehipo nehipo wanawe nehipo wannapo wannapo wannapo wanawe wanipo 
 
wanipo wanapo wanapo wanapo wehipo wanapo wanapo wanawe wanapo wannawe wannipe 
 
munini guanpo guanapo guanapo guannapo nehipo wanapo wanawe wanawe wanawe wanawe 
 
kokiko wanipo wanapo wanapo wanapo wanapo wanapo wanapo wanapo wanawe wannapo 
 
gupoki wanapo wanapo wanapo wanapo wanapo wanapo wanapo wanawe wanawe wannapo 
 
gukopo niwapo gukiwe guanawe nehipo wanapo wanapo wanawe wanawe wanawe wannawe 
 
muhuke nihapo wanawe wanapo wanapo wanapo wanapo wanawe wanapo wanawe wanawe 
 
kiwani gukiwa gukiwa gukiwe guhiwie wannapo guihikipowe guihipipo guhipipo gihipipowe guhithiko 
 
kihumu wanaho wanahe guannapo guikiwe guihikipo nehipo nihipo guhipipo guihikipowe guithike 
 
nipohu kiniwa wannapo wannawe nehipowe guihipowe guihikipowe guihikipow guihikipowe guhipipo guihipikowe 
 
wahuko gukiwa gukiwa wahipo nehipo wanapo guhipipow guihipipo guihikipowe guhipipo guihikipowe 
 
wanihu nikiwa guwana wanawe guwinike wanapo guhipipow guhipipo guihipipo guihipipo guihipipo 
 








0b 1b 2b 3b 4b 5b 6b 7b 8b 9b 10b 
 
pogugu gupogo gowaki huwaki wahiki gopoko gopogo mahini mahini wakini wakini 
 
nihuwa gowaki gopogo huwaki humini humuni wikini wikinini wikinini wakinini wakinini 
 
kokeke wahiki wahiki huwaki wahiki minini gopoka miuni mahinini wakini wakini 
 
kiwake kiwaki wahiki humini humini wahiki wikini wahini mahini mahini mahini 
 
kimupo wahuko huwaki waki humini minini humini wikinini wakinini wakinini wakinini 
 
hunini wahiki wahiki wahiki wahiki wahiki minini gopogo wakini wakini wakini 
 
wanipo gokiki gopogo gopogo muini miuni minini miuni miuni miuni miuni 
 
munini huwaki hunini huini gopogo gopogo miuni miuni miuni miuni muini 
 
kokiko gupoke gopoki gopogo gopogo wanini miuni miuni miuni miuni miuni 
 
gupoki gopoki munini munini wakape hakini wahini wahini miuni miuni muini 
 
gukopo munini munini munini munini wahiki wahini wahini gopoka gopoka gopoka 
 
muhuke gopoki munini munini munini gopogo wahini miuni miuni miuni miuni 
 
kiwani gupoki gupoke kepoke minoke manini manini mahini gopogo gopogo gopogo 
 
kihumu hupoko hupogo gopopo muini gopogo gopogo gopoka gopoka gopoka gopoka 
 
nipohu kekoke kekoke kepoke gopogo gopoka minini gopoka gopoka gopoka gopoka 
 
wahuko wanini gopoki gopogo gopogo gopogo gopogo wahini gopoka gopoka gopoka 
 
wanihu gowako kepoke kepoke kepoke gopogo gopoka gopogo gopoka gopoka gopoka 
 
gukogu wahiki wapogo hupogo gopogo minini minini gopoka gopoka gopoka gopoka 
 





Polyadic Average for Learnability 
 
Polyadic Average for Structure 
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